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| 1 |
ID:
092810
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Vertical unbundling in the electricity sector is a hot political topic in the European Union. The European Commission has decided that the ownership unbundling of transmission networks from other stages in the value chain is the most effective way to ensure fair network access and infrastructure investment. While this European unbundling debate has not ended yet and most countries still do not have an independent transmission system operator (TSO), the Dutch government has already taken one step further. In 2008, it decided that distribution companies should be completely separated from commercial activities that are part of the same holding (generation, trade and supply). This governmental decision has been fiercely debated. Although the goal is to improve competition as well as security of supply, these benefits are uncertain. Nevertheless, it is certain that ownership unbundling comes at a cost. In this paper we present an ex ante cost-benefit analysis of the Dutch unbundling act. We conclude that it is unlikely that this act is welfare enhancing: divorce comes at a price.
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| 2 |
ID:
109451
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
New technologies will enable households to generate an increasing amount of their own electricity. Intentions to generate own power are a preliminary step towards actual behavior. Because own generation is still very limited and the behavior of early adopters may not be representative for the complete population, our study focuses on intentions rather than actual behavior. A consumer survey among 2047 Dutch households reveals that environmental concerns are the most important driver of a household's intention to generate its own power. Affinity with technology and energy and the reputation of electricity companies are also significant drivers, but financial factors and power outages are not. About 40% of Dutch households have an intention to generate their own power, with an overrepresentation of young households. This group falls apart in two sub segments; for the "generating savers" (21%) a high intention to generate own power coincides with a high intention to save energy, whereas generating users (18%) combine a high intention to generate own power with a low intention to save energy.
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| 3 |
ID:
105732
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the economic analysis (social cost-benefit analysis) underlying two decisions to build an interconnector (NorNed and the East-West interconnector) in Europe. The main conclusion is that current interconnector and transmission investment decisions in Europe are unlikely to maximize social welfare. The arguments are as follows. (i) It is unclear how much demand for transmission capacity and interconnectors actually exists, and thus the benefits of investment are unclear. (ii) Both analyses underlying the investments studied are incorrect, to the point where, in one case, even the sign may be wrong. (iii) The main criticism concerns the fact that they do not take the resulting changes in generator investment plans into account and ignore the (potential) benefits of increased competition. (iv) Several smaller issues can be improved, such as the discount rate used. (v) Decisions at the European level are taken very differently, and approval may depend on which authority grants approval. (vi) Interconnector decisions receive the most attention, although most money goes to transmission investments. Two research recommendations for future improvements are formulated.
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