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| 1 |
ID:
092862
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Incentive regulation for networks has been an important part of the reform agenda in a number of countries. As part of this regulatory process, incentives are put in place to improve the cost efficiency of network companies by rewarding good performance relative to a pre-defined benchmark. The techniques used to establish benchmarks are central to the efficiency improvements that are ultimately achieved. Much experience has been gained internationally in the application of benchmarking techniques and we now have a solid understanding of the main indicators of best practice. What we are lacking is a more complete understanding of the factors that influence choice of methods by regulators. In this paper, we present the results of an international survey of energy regulators in 40 countries conducted electronically between June and October 2008. Regulators from European, Australasian and Latin American countries are represented in the survey. Our results show that benchmarking techniques are now widespread in the regulation of gas and electricity networks. Best practice, however, is limited to a small number of regulators. We conclude by summarising existing trends and offering some recommendations on overcoming barriers to best practice efficiency analysis.
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| 2 |
ID:
132622
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study explores different practices for accelerating the integration of generating facilities to the electricity network using smart solutions. Case studies from Great Britain, Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and the Unites States of America were selected. The paper assesses and compares the different Principles of Access that have been implemented in these countries, such as Last-in First-out (LIFO), Pro Rata and Market-Based. The social optimality of these approaches is also discussed. The paper also evaluates how the risk (regarding curtailment and investment) is allocated between parties (distribution network operators, generators and customers). Even though the cases are diverse, important findings and lessons have been identified which may assist distribution network operators to address the issue of increasing the connection of distributed generation while managing efficiently and economically energy exports from generators.
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| 3 |
ID:
110715
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this paper we use a best practice index constructed from the survey responses of regulators in 40 countries to explore the determinants of the methods used in electricity network regulation. Drawing from the incentive regulation and institutional economics literature, we construct an empirical model to investigate the impact of industry size, political and economic institutions on the degree of best practice regulation. Our results suggest that the existence and experience of an independent regulator is the most important institutional determinant of best practice regulation. In addition, small numbers of network companies act as a constraint on the use of advanced benchmarking methods. Finally, regional effects are also important. These findings lead us to question whether one "best practice" model is in fact applicable to countries with very different political and economic contexts.
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| 4 |
ID:
125717
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Benchmarking of electricity networks has a key role in sharing the benefits of efficiency improvements with consumers and ensuring regulated companies earn a fair return on their investments. This paper analyses and contrasts the theory and practice of international benchmarking of electricity transmission by regulators. We examine the literature relevant to electricity transmission benchmarking and discuss the results of a survey of 25 national electricity regulators. While new panel data techniques aimed at dealing with unobserved heterogeneity and the validity of the comparator group look intellectually promising, our survey suggests that they are in their infancy for regulatory purposes. In electricity transmission, relative to electricity distribution, choosing variables is particularly difficult, because of the large number of potential variables to choose from. Failure to apply benchmarking appropriately may negatively affect investors' willingness to invest in the future. While few of our surveyed regulators acknowledge that regulatory risk is currently an issue in transmission benchmarking, many more concede it might be. In the meantime new regulatory approaches - such as those based on tendering, negotiated settlements, a wider range of outputs or longer term grid planning - are emerging and will necessarily involve a reduced role for benchmarking.
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| 5 |
ID:
114288
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the choice, in electricity and gas systems, between having an independent system operator (ISO) and an independent transmission system operator (ITSO). Both optimise the operation of the system in real time. However ISOs do not own any electricity transmission wires or gas transmission pipes (i.e. electricity and gas systems), while ITSOs do. To examine the choice we will discuss the functions, cost structure, governance and pricing of the ISO, focussing on the US, with regard to controlling the system and operating associated power markets. We outline an ideal model for an electricity system operator and examine the extent to which system operation in the US and the UK conforms to the ideal. Finally, we look at the evolving role of system operators and how their efficiency might be evaluated. We conclude that there is much to learn from ISO experience in operating existing transmission systems.
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| 6 |
ID:
150348
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper focuses on how to promote regional cooperation in electricity. We begin by discussing the theory of international trade cooperation in electricity, with a view to discussing what preconditions might be important in facilitating wide area trading across national borders.
We then develop lessons based on the comparison of four case studies. These include three regional developing country power pools – the Southern African Power pool (SAPP), West African Power pool (WAPP) and the Central American Power Market (MER). We contrast these with Northern Europe's Nord Pool. These cases highlight both the potential and difficulty of having cross-jurisdictional power pools.
In the light of the theory and evidence we present, we draw key lessons in the areas of: preconditions for trading; necessary institutional arrangements; practicalities of timetabling; reasons to be hopeful about future prospects.
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| 7 |
ID:
116700
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The aim of this paper is to discuss the period of energy privatisation and liberalisation which began in the 1980s within its wider historical context. The key issues are what has been learned from this recent period, and how significant is it in the light of an energy transition to low carbon energy system by 2050? Energy liberalisation has led to positive and globally widespread but modest efficiency gains but a lack of clearly visible direct benefits to households in many countries. It has significantly improved the governance of monopoly utilities (via independent regulators), the prospects for competition and innovation, and the quality of policy instruments for environmental emissions control (through the emergence of trading mechanisms). We conclude that it is not liberalisation per se that will determine the movement towards a low carbon energy transition, but the willingness of societies to bear the cost, which will be significant no matter what the extent of liberalisation.
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