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| 1 |
ID:
126918
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| 2 |
ID:
115022
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a detailed criticism of Darioush Bayandor's book Iran and the CIA. Bayandor argues that certain Shi'a clerics, rather than the US Central Intelligence Agency, were the main actors responsible for overthrowing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in August 1953. Bayandor presents no major new evidence to support this claim. He gives too much weight to certain statements, draws unwarranted inferences from others, and discounts or disregards a wealth of evidence that conflicts with his account. He overemphasizes the role of civilian crowds in the overthrow of Mosaddeq and underemphasizes the role of Iranian military units organized by the CIA. And he fails to acknowledge the importance of US and especially British efforts to foment opposition to Mosaddeq before the coup.
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| 3 |
ID:
123905
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
SO FAR, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), as well as the other Arab monarchies (with the exception of Bahrain), remains outside the "Arab thaw" zone. Its top crust has preserved political and social stability which relied for many years and relies now on three factors: first, petrodollars which deal with real and potential causes of social unrest; second, the regime which sides with the conservative religious circles and tribal leaders; third, the West, the United States in the first place, which guarantees national security.
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| 4 |
ID:
109833
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| 5 |
ID:
130786
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| 6 |
ID:
095113
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
If the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 has produced unprecedented consequences for the internal policies of Middle Eastern regimes, this is not related to the upsurge of democratization that was supposed to spread like a contagion through the neighboring countries. Rather, it is due to the increased impact of the Shi?i issue on the national political agendas of many Arab states. Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, many observers thus drew attention to the emergence of what they regarded as a Shi?i "revival" in the Middle East-a perception that the military success of the Lebanese Hizbullah against Israel in the summer of 2006 seemed to confirm.
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| 7 |
ID:
190090
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sectarian-based violent extremism has long been a security concern for the Government of Pakistan. Despite the perseverance of state authorities in countering violent extremism, a discourse centered on horizontal inequalities as the determinant of violent extremism and conflict remains lacking. This paper highlights the importance of an empirical study in understanding the nexus between horizontal inequalities and sectarian-based violent extremism in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). By analyzing the responses from Shia and Sunni sectarian identities, the study contextualizes violent conflict and elucidates how horizontal inequalities intersect with sectarian identities in the capital city of GB. In doing so, socioeconomic and cultural inequalities have been evaluated. The study relies on a multistage random sample of 212 respondents through a structured questionnaire. The findings reflect significant socioeconomic inequalities between the sectarian identities and suggest a linear relationship in which horizontal inequalities generate identity-driven “us” vs “them.”
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| 8 |
ID:
096455
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| 9 |
ID:
102405
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The world breathed a sigh of relief at the announcement of a new Iraqi government on 21 December 2010. After nine months of wrangling following the 7 March elections, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki finally engineered a deal that kept him in place at the head of a 42-person cabinet. Maliki was unable to name a full coterie of ministers; ten of the portfolios, including the main security ministries, are being managed on a temporary basis by other ministers until permanent nominations are made. Nevertheless, approval of the cabinet brought to an end a crisis that left the political system in limbo and saw a deterioration of the security situation.
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| 10 |
ID:
109545
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| 11 |
ID:
129383
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| 12 |
ID:
146757
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| 13 |
ID:
118653
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| 14 |
ID:
121524
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| 15 |
ID:
118703
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| 16 |
ID:
120054
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| 17 |
ID:
127222
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| 18 |
ID:
143156
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| 19 |
ID:
096890
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| 20 |
ID:
131133
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Generating strategy may be easy, but implementing it is difficult. Initially understanding the problem is tough; worse, it may itself change as an operation goes on. Reflecting on his experience on recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, former US general and commander of ISAF, Stan A McChrystal, outlines the challenges of operational leadership and suggests some key lessons for leaders and policy-makers.
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