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| 1 |
ID:
118887
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| 2 |
ID:
101235
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Indian elites spent much of Barack Obama's first year trying to discern whether he would continue the "strategic partnership" cultivated between New Delhi and Washington over the previous decade. In the absence of early affirmation and concerned that the United States was developing a pro-Pakistan outlook on regional security issues (particularly Kashmir), India focused intensely on the new president's evolving "Af-Pak" policy as a proxy for the state of U.S.-India relations. This impulse made for continued uncertainty, given the unsettled U.S. regional strategy. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's official visit to Washington in November 2009 put a new seal on U.S.-India friendship, and New Delhi's worst fears about U.S. intentions have been laid to rest. The strategic partnership remains intact, albeit amid less euphoria than during the Bush administration. It likely will continue to mature owing to broadly convergent strategic interests, but U.S. and Indian interests are least convergent with respect to Pakistan's involvement in Afghan affairs, and this will continue to be a source of tension in U.S.-India relations.
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| 3 |
ID:
092997
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many in India feared that the burgeoning US--India relationship would collapse under President Obama, but his policies so far have alleviated these concerns. The US has not tried to mediate in Kashmir, has gone ahead on the civil nuclear energy agreement, and entered into a high-level strategic dialogue with India. The biggest potential thorn in US--India relations could be the US approach to Pakistan: Obama could be tempted to tolerate a military-dominated Pakistan and, in order to enable a speedy exit from Afghanistan, could seek a Chinese guarantee in Afghanistan and (indirectly) Pakistan. This would have serious consequences for India and would bring back bitter memories of US instrumentalism in South Asia.
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| 4 |
ID:
138031
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| 5 |
ID:
133670
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the century ahead, U.S. strategic interests will align closely with those of India, and so keeping the U.S.-India relationship strong is crucial. The Obama administration needs to make Delhi a higher priority.
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| 6 |
ID:
131591
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Befitting two raucous democracies, once estranged but increasingly fraternal, the U.S.-India relationship routinely evokes grandiloquence about "natural allies," "an affair of the heart," "kindred spirits," "common DNA" and a defining partnership" shaping the destiny of the 21st century. Such sentiments were on full display in late 2009 when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the White House as President Baraek Obama's first official state guest. In the run-up to the event, Obama declared that Mahatma Gandhi "was a real hero of mine" and let it be known that he considered Singh and India part of his family. The extravagant state dinner staged on the South Lawn was the hottest ticket in town, attracting party crashers to boot, and even the rainy weather did not dim an event the Washington Post likened to a Hollywood production. And with expectations raised by the recently-codified U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, the two leaders spoke augustly about a "future that beckons all of us."'
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| 7 |
ID:
132079
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Utilizing prevailing International Relations theory, this article seeks to explain the conditions under which India and the United States can be expected to achieve deep, long-term, strategic cooperation that could culminate in a formal alliance. Specifically, it considers the insights and predictions of realist and liberal theories while also considering critical domestic level factors that may shape India's capacity to be a reliable and attractive partner. While dramatic progress has been made since the initial thawing of the Cold War relationship, this article concludes that the future is likely to be a mixed bag, as the recent Obama experience has reflected. Only the emergence of an overtly revisionist China is likely to drive New Delhi and Washington toward a traditional alliance.
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| 8 |
ID:
111795
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| 9 |
ID:
130690
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