Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
132353
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
It is commonly believed that torture is an effective tool for combating an insurgent threat. Yet while torture is practiced in nearly all counterinsurgency campaigns, the evidence documenting torture's effects remains severely limited. This study provides the first micro-level statistical analysis of torture's relation to subsequent killings committed by insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. The theoretical arguments contend that torture is ineffective for reducing killings perpetrated by insurgents both because it fails to reduce insurgent capacities for violence and because it can increase the incentives for insurgents to commit future killings. The theory also links torture to other forms of state violence. Specifically, engaging in torture is expected to be associated with increased killings perpetrated by counterinsurgents. Monthly municipal-level data on political violence are used to analyze torture committed by counterinsurgents during the Guatemalan civil war (1977-94). Using a matched-sample, difference-in-difference identification strategy and data compiled from 22 different press and NGO sources as well as thousands of interviews, the study estimates how torture is related to short-term changes in killings perpetrated by both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Killings by counterinsurgents are shown to increase significantly following torture. However, torture appears to have no robust correlation with subsequent killings by insurgents. Based on this evidence the study concludes that torture is ineffective for reducing insurgent perpetrated killings.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
ID:
153611
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
The concept of order is often neglected in the study of conflict – seemingly such a ‘disordering’ process. With the recent increase in the examination of rebel governance however, bringing order back into our understanding of rebel and insurgent groups has much to offer in exploring the everyday politics which connect authorities, rebel movements and the population itself, in a complex mass of intersubjective and power-based interactions and negotiations. Rebels both shape and are shaped by existing forms of order in complex and ongoing ways. This article explores how varying elements interact in the negotiation, framing and enforcement of order and develops an original analytical framework to examine the perpetual negotiations of rebel movements in their attempts to cement their control.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
3 |
ID:
144333
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
In a military intervention, do surges work? I compare the failed ‘surge’ in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: the military dimensions and strategy of the surging forces, the military capabilities of the host forces, the political vitality and will of the host country, and the political commitment in the domestic politics of the intervener. I find that the last feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the American political commitment was lacking.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
ID:
169919
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
To date, scholarly work on armed groups has seldom considered the notion of rebel resilience, or the factors that enable these groups to survive despite time, military pressure, and the myriad contingent events of civil war. In an effort to develop an explanatory framework for resilience as a distinct outcome of civil war and rebellion, this article examines the conditions under which the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) has persisted for nearly three decades. Based on fieldwork and original research, the article explains the LRA’s resilience in light of the group’s organizational structure and resource self-sufficiency, which have been well suited for the borderlands of East and Central Africa. The LRA is a key case of rebel resilience. It is important because it sheds light on the organizational foundations of armed groups, the relationship between resources and rebellion, and the broader study of conflict duration and termination. Understanding the sources of the LRA’s resilience can inform efforts to end such insurgencies.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5 |
ID:
076941
|
|
|
Publication |
2007.
|
Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the traditional political and economic factors that have been purported to explain the prevalence of insurgency. It tests the following hypotheses at the subnational level in Colombia: guerrilla violence is positively associated with exports; higher levels of insurgency are associated with low levels of GDP per capita or negative growth rates; guerrilla violence emerges in the context of weak state presence; and higher levels of state repression are associated with higher levels of insurgent violence. The analysis utilizes a zero-inflated negative binomial to capture dynamics of both intensity and onset of violence. The econometric analysis is supplemented with cartographic visualization and qualitative analysis.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6 |
ID:
173831
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
The disillusionment with U.S.-led counter insurgent efforts to gain a deeper understanding of social dynamics in countries with extensive tribal structures has led to a rejection of programs aimed to improve cultural competency. The Islamic State movement does not share this perception, and its strategists blamed its early failures during the U.S. occupation on a flawed understanding of tribal dynamics. This paper traces the political, ideological, and structural changes the leaders of the Islamic State movement made to adapt its approach toward the Sunni tribes of Iraq and later Syria, in order to develop a deeper base of popular support for its caliphate project. The group’s study of the tribes was done by a new tribal engagement office that put into motion an ethnographic study of tribal networks in key areas. There is evidence that the inspiration for this change came from its opponents. The Islamic State movement used these new insights to win a greater level of influence in rural areas, which in turn influenced its success in 2014. This research supports the idea that insurgency and counterinsurgency success often depend on which side is best at the incorporation of cultural and societal knowledge into policy and strategy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
7 |
ID:
091891
|
|
|
Publication |
2009.
|
Summary/Abstract |
The Islamist insurgent group, the Abu Sayyaf Group, has proven its ability to inflict significant losses on the Philippine military in recent attacks. Gorden Arthur examines the army's operations aimed at dismantling the rebel group and undermining its civilian support.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
8 |
ID:
063252
|
|
|
9 |
ID:
185290
|
|
|
10 |
ID:
142341
|
|
|
11 |
ID:
108407
|
|
|
12 |
ID:
127873
|
|
|
13 |
ID:
081874
|
|
|
Publication |
2008.
|
Summary/Abstract |
The year 2007 has not brought much hope for Afghans whose country remains in the grip of increasing violence and Taliban insurgency, both hampering reconstruction. The increasing levels of opium production have provided a boost to the growing illicit economy and also to the insurgency. Governmental institutions remain frail and are largely ineffective outside the capital
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
14 |
ID:
093936
|
|
|
Publication |
2010.
|
Summary/Abstract |
Even if all essential parties are interested in a negotiated settlement, getting to yes is no sure thing.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
15 |
ID:
094843
|
|
|
Publication |
2010.
|
Summary/Abstract |
The international intervention in Afghanistan has contributed to entrenched state weakness and rising insecurity. Despite increased references to the need for reconciliation with the Taliban and a political solution to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, few specifics have been offered by academics or policymakers. Building on research into conflict resolution and an analysis of the composition and motivation of the insurgency, this article addresses this gap by asking whether conditions are currently "ripe" for a negotiated settlement, how "ripeness" may be achieved, and, once achieved, how a political settlement might best be pursued.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
16 |
ID:
133161
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
The war in Afghanistan is not over. Nor is it ending any time soon. The U.S. role may end in 2016, in whole or in part, but the war will continue-and its ultimate outcome is very much in doubt. The conflict is now stalemated militarily, and will likely stay that way as long as outsiders pay the large bills needed to keep the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in the field and fighting. The war will thus grind onward until this funding dries up or the two sides negotiate a compromise settlement, neither of which is imminent. Depending on how any talks unfold, historians in 2050 could thus look back on this war as a costly but tolerable outcome for the West, as a wasteful disaster, or as something in between; for now, all we know for sure is that it continues.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
17 |
ID:
133602
|
|
|
Publication |
2014.
|
Summary/Abstract |
The Afghan government's peace and reconciliation overtures to the militants, initially at the unofficial level but later sanctioned officially, have formed a key theme of state security policy from the early days of the post-Taliban administration in Afghanistan. Yet far from producing peace and stability, they seem to have played into the hands of the violent groups intent on overthrowing the country's internationally supported and legitimate political system in the past decade. There is no doubt about the importance of national reconciliation as a wider process of overcoming the legacy of beleaguered social relationships and forging a common vision for the future among all Afghans, but the nature of the government's reconciliation policy, which borders on appeasement of the militants, seems so far to have created more vulnerabilities than strengths in the face of increasingly emboldened anti-state violent groups.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
18 |
ID:
038324
|
|
|
Publication |
London, Oxford University Press, 1972.
|
Description |
x, 250p
|
Standard Number |
01921840204
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
010530 | 355.0218096/GIB 010530 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
19 |
ID:
052862
|
|
|
20 |
ID:
053810
|
|
|