Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
125283
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
Summer 2013 brought one of the most violent fighting seasons in Afghanistan since the US military and state-building effort began in 2001. On the cusp of the momentous 2014 presidential elections and a year before the majority of international coalition forces would depart from the country in the midst of transferring security functions to the coalition-supported Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Taliban is dug in and still ferocious. It is testing the Afghan security forces, which since June 2013 are supposed to be taking the lead in providing security throughout the country while international forces are increasingly disengaging from combat and departing Afghanistan.
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2 |
ID:
105612
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3 |
ID:
104864
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4 |
ID:
094728
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
NATO has traditionally treated Russia as a strategic pariah. But now, the West urgently needs Moscow's cooperation on a host of issues. A vision for turning Russia into a productive member of the Euro-Atlantic community is within reach: Russia should join NATO. Although NATO would run a strategic risk by admitting Russia, the Atlantic alliance is actually running a greater strategic risk by excluding it.
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5 |
ID:
095644
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6 |
ID:
094716
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7 |
ID:
093085
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The rise of China poses a great challenge for the transatlantic alliance. Although the common values that bind Europe and North America will not vanish, increasing demands on US resources from the Asia-Pacific region will erode the pre-eminence of the Atlantic alliance in American security policy. NATO must therefore adapt to the new reality by acknowledging the global nature of US commitments in its new Strategic Concept - and European powers must have a debate about the implications of East Asia for their own security.
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8 |
ID:
104516
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9 |
ID:
123442
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
Ten year on since its deliverance from the vicious clutch of the obscurantist Taliban, Afghainstan today is bestest by problems created and coumpounded by a largely unsuccessful US-led military campaign. The civilian population is largely alienated by wanton deaths of innocents is misdirected NATO ground assaults, aerial bombardments, and drone attacks. Also saddled with a decade-old regime largely confined to urban centres, President Hamid Harzai is demoralized not only by his failure to build a domestic support base but also by his complete disenchantment with the United States and other Western allies, which has led to his subsequent and desparate search for allies among the Taliban themselves. Meanwhile, both Pakistan on the eastern front and Iran on the Western front brazenly continue to play their own games by promoting proxies within the indigenous fundamentalist forces. Besides, drug trafficking and corruption, among a host of other problems, continue to defy solutions. By no means, a beguiling picture that the South Asian country today presents to the world.
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10 |
ID:
105614
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11 |
ID:
095645
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12 |
ID:
106271
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.
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13 |
ID:
094774
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14 |
ID:
102873
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15 |
ID:
096343
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