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| 1 |
ID:
118112
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| 2 |
ID:
187195
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| 3 |
ID:
119369
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| 4 |
ID:
127942
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China and India enjoy relative peace between them and have avoided another war after the one fought in 1962. However, at times, there have been clashes and crisis along the line of actual control (LAC) that have put to test the conflict management skills of political and military leadership of both the countries. On each occasion, it shook India's public opinion. The summer crisis in 2013 was no different. As the Chinese PLA seized the opportunity and lay tents almost 19 km inside the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Daulti Beg Oldi (DBO) sector during April 15-May 5, 2013, The Indian public opinion was up in arms. The President refusal on the part of Chinese troops to withdraw only raised the stakes in the crisis. Concurrently, the government of India faced unprecedented strong domestic criticism over handling of relation with China in general and the border intrusion in particular.
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| 5 |
ID:
174861
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| 6 |
ID:
138130
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| Summary/Abstract |
Will India and China resolve their boundary dispute during the tenure of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping? The strategic communities in both countries are optimistic, particularly after the high tension prevailing along the border during President Xi Jinping’s tour of India in September 2014. Both Prime Minister Modi and President Xi are seen as decisive leaders.1 Both are expected to hold power in their respective countries for a few years to come. Personalities and personas matter greatly for scoring political brownie points. The boundary dispute, quintessentially, is political in nature. The 2005 Agreement on the ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India–China Boundary Question’ acknowledged as much: the ‘two sides are seeking a political settlement of the boundary question’.2 In future India–China boundary negotiations, will the two leaders go for territorial exchange or will they remain content with the status quo, and simply define the Line of Actual Control (LAC)?
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| 7 |
ID:
174190
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| Summary/Abstract |
Amidst the ongoing military stand-off between India and China at the LAC, a fundamental question making the round is China’s real motives behind prolonging this stand –off. A similar situation arose between the two countries in June 2017 at the Doklam, which continued for 73 days, but was resolved through diploma tic negotiations. This time when China tried to alter the status quo in May, 2020 in the Eastern Ladakh, the diplomatic and military level s negotiations were launched to resolve this stand-off.
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| 8 |
ID:
098637
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| 9 |
ID:
093158
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| 10 |
ID:
129995
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| 11 |
ID:
110613
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| 12 |
ID:
176360
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| 13 |
ID:
122292
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| 14 |
ID:
128756
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| 15 |
ID:
187154
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how the Chinese elites are interpreting China’s growing presence in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region and the various ways in which the United States is responding to China’s expanding activity in the region. Some of China’s elites caution that China’s international posturing could be overly assertive. Regarding China’s growing role in the LAC, they have made a note of US sensitivities, in addition to China’s challenges and limitations in various Latin American countries. Regarding the US response, some US concerns may be legitimate, and others are less valid. Looking ahead, even though US–China interactions in the LAC will remain competitive, the US and China could potentially avoid counterproductive policies while also pursuing pragmatic co-operation. While China does not yet face a serious problem of strategic overstretching in the LAC, China’s domestic debate on the topic will provide feedback to China’s policymakers and promote fruitful China–LAC relations.
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| 16 |
ID:
172795
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| Summary/Abstract |
By its ill-considered announcement that ‘rules of engagement’ have been changed for the Indian Army after the brutalization of its 20 soldiers, the Modi government altered the management of the 27-year-old Line of Actual Control (LAC), premised upon no use of weapons, to People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) advantage. While not officially clarified, it meant that the army soldiers when face-to-face with the PLA would be armed with orders to fire in self-defence. It is not realised that escalation, once initiated, is controlled by the militarily stronger side, in this case, the PLA.
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| 17 |
ID:
172798
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| Summary/Abstract |
On the night of June 15-16 nearly 600 Indian and Chinese soldiers were caught in skirmishes at an altitude of 13,500 feet along the steep embankment of the Galwan river. The six-hour clash in pitch darkness was a medieval encounter with the use of clubs, iron rods, stones and bare hands that saw 20 Indians—most of whom fell to their death in the icy waters of the Galwan river below—and 45 Chinese dead (35 as per US Intelligence accounts). No shots were fired, but it was the first loss of lives along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since 1975 and marked a complete turnaround in Indo-China relations.
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| 18 |
ID:
172772
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has been an unusually busy summer for the ministry of defence (MoD). On the one hand, since early 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has been carrying out minor transgressions all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) from Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim to Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, firmly stationed itself in eastern and south-eastern Ladakh in April.
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| 19 |
ID:
174200
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s ‘peaceful rise’ policy, which came close on the heels of Deng’s strategy, was articulated by Chinese leaders in 2003 to similarly ward off international fears about Beijing’s growing economic and political strength. In 2004, Premier Wen Jiabo famously explained, China’s peaceful rise “will not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country”2.
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| 20 |
ID:
110615
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