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ID:
089512
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Mediating regional conflict in Asia is a delicate art. It requires an acute understanding of the unique mediation culture in the region. China's mediation in the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula reveals key elements of this art and offers useful lessons. China's experience illustrates that an influential but neutral and harmony-oriented mediator is critical in the Asian context. It is equally essential for the mediator to (1) abide by the principle of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs while maintaining active intervention as dispute escalates, (2) stand ready to nudge those being mediated toward action when necessary to advance peaceful negotiations, (3) establish an optimal environment to foster communication and reduce hostility between the major parties in dispute, (4) serve as an honest broker but remain firm in its own position and cautiously take initiatives to guide the talks, (5) advocate a step-by-step approach to the negotiation process, and (6) aim for the outcome of negotiations to be a give-and-take agreement. Although Asia is a conflict-prone region, Asians traditionally confuse mediation with meddling. As a result, non-Asians often try to serve as mediators for Asia. For more effective mediations, it is essential that Asians rediscover their useful mediation skills and that non-Asians better understand the Asian art of mediation when they act as mediator.
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2 |
ID:
089511
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
U.S. President Barack Obama made a campaign promise to the nation that, if elected, he would withdraw combat forces from Iraq and shift the focus of U.S. strategy from the Middle East to the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, where a renascent and spreading Taliban movement harbors al Qaeda leaders and foot soldiers and threatens to reverse the forces of change in Afghanistan. Obama's declared intention to increase the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan appears not only to have the general approval of his military advisers, but also to have won over many of the foreign and national security analysts both within and outside the administration. The author examines the wisdom of this policy now, before a thorough debate has occurred and before several significant issues have been addressed
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