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ID:
093516
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese government has enacted policies to promote alternative vehicle fuels (AVFs) and alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs), including city bus fleets. The life cycle (LC), energy savings (ES) and GHG reduction (GR) profiles of AVFs/AFVs are critical to those policy decisions. The well-to-wheels module of the Tsinghua-CA3EM model is employed to investigate actual performance data. Compared with conventional buses, AFVs offer differences in performance in terms of both ES and GR. Only half of the AFVs analyzed demonstrate dual benefits. However, all non-oil/gas pathways can substitute oil/gas with coal. Current policies seek to promote technology improvements and market creation initiatives within the guiding framework of national-level diversification and district-level uniformity. Combined with their actual LC behavior and in keeping with near- and long-term strategies, integrated policies should seek to (1) apply hybrid electric technology to diesel buses; (2) encourage NG/LPG buses in gas-abundant cities; (3) promote commercialize electric buses or plug-in capable vehicles through battery technology innovation; (4) support fuel cell buses and hydrogen technology R&D for future potential applications; and (5) conduct further research on boosting vehicle fuel efficiency, applying low-carbon transportation technologies, and addressing all resultant implications of coal-based transportation solutions to human health and natural resources.
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| 2 |
ID:
137691
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| Summary/Abstract |
The difficulty of charging electric vehicles (EVs) is now hindering their further development. Governments generally choose to build stations for home charging (including piles) within residential communities. Given the conflict of interest between various government agencies and property management companies, constructing a charging station within residential communities would result in welfare loss for the property management companies and therefore lead to the principal–agent problem. This paper constructs a two-period imperfect information game theory model to study the moral hazard involved in this issue and government agencies׳ optimal choice. In the analytic solution of the model, we find that the optimal choice for a farsighted government agency is to constantly improve the incentive mechanism and introduce charging stations only when the conflict of interest is eliminated. Any benefits derived from government regulations by force would prove short-lived. The government should focus on long-term returns in the development of EVs, and its optimal mechanism should be designed to mitigate the principal–agent problem of property management companies, thereby accelerate the progress of EV charging infrastructure and improve overall social welfare.
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