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| 1 |
ID:
113168
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Caracas-Last July, when Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was being treated for an undisclosed type of cancer, he announced on his 57th birthday that he had changed the slogan defining his Bolivarian Revolution. Until then, soldiers were required to salute their superiors with "Motherland, socialism, or death." Standing next to his daughters on the balcony of the Miraflores Palace, the president's official workplace in Caracas, and wearing a yellow shirt instead of his trademark red, he proclaimed, "We have to live, and we have to come out victorious. That's why I propose a new slogan. There's no death here. There's life." Then thrusting his left fist into the air, he shouted, "Socialist motherland and victory, we will live, and we will come out victorious." His followers responded to the new salute with a mass ovation.
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| 2 |
ID:
117709
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez fended off a spirited challenge by Governor Henrique Capriles this fall. But continuing questions about Chavez's health and the country's dismal governance suggest that change may be coming soon. Looking ahead, the opposition will need to address concerns by the very poor that social spending will dry up if Chávez is no longer in office. Meanwhile, political differences and power struggles, and a sense of demoralization, risk undermining Capriles' diverse coalition. The regional scenario would look very different without Chávez. External players should restrain from meddling during this period of uncertainty. Instead, support should focus on trying to ensure that Venezuelans continue to rely on the ballot box in determining the course of a country facing so many daunting problems.
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| 3 |
ID:
116654
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Is the world's longest active civil war finally coming to an end? In November 2012 the Colombian government and the left-wing guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) began full-fledged peace negotiations in Havana, Cuba. But the mood in Bogotá is ambivalent, with a yearning for peace tempered by a deep-seated distrust of FARC and its negotiating tactics.
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| 4 |
ID:
129221
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| 5 |
ID:
116438
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The study of Latin American politics has always generated great new research questions, and within Latin America, no country's experience has generated more interesting questions than Venezuela since the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998. Contemporary Venezuela raises fascinating questions about the collapse of a highly institutionalized party system and the erosion or breakdown of what had been the third-oldest democracy outside of the advanced industrial democracies. What accounts for these stunning developments? What can we learn from them? These issues go to the core of important developments in Latin American politics, and they are major issues for comparative political scientists beyond Latin America.
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| 6 |
ID:
093669
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Signs of frustration are unmistakable in Washington and in many Latin American capitals, despite Obama's immense personal appeal and the continued promise of a more productive partnership.
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| 7 |
ID:
115428
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| 8 |
ID:
123482
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| 9 |
ID:
121550
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the wake of the Cold War, regional democratization and economic liberalization were supposed to usher in an opportunity to build a common hemispheric security agenda, designed to unite the United States and Latin America in collaboration against the "new" security threats posed by organized crime and violent nonstate actors. Two decades later, the threats remain much the same, yet the hemispheric security agenda has fragmented, replaced in part by projects designed to build specifically South American regional institutions. As some scholars predicted, heterogeneous threat perceptions across the region, differences over democratization, and tensions over the effects of free trade and market liberalization have confounded the effort to build a hemispheric security agenda. Yet the efforts by former President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela to radically transform the regional security order by building a Bolivarian alliance of states as an explicit counterweight to U.S. power have also fallen short. Instead, Brazil's ascent as a global economic power and the growing prosperity of the region as a whole has created an opportunity for Brazil to organize new mid-range political institutions, embodied in the Union of South American States (UNASUR), that exclude the United States yet pursue a consensual security agenda. This emerging regional order is designed by Brazil to secure its leadership in South America and allow it to choose when and where to involve the United States in managing regional crises. Yet, Brazil is finding that the very obstacles that confounded hemispheric security collaboration after the Cold War still endure in South America, limiting the effectiveness of the emerging regional security order.
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| 10 |
ID:
115929
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| 11 |
ID:
115398
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| 12 |
ID:
129206
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| 13 |
ID:
132158
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When mass protests against the government erupted in Venezuela early in February, murder rates in the country were already shocking-close to twenty-five thousand people dead in the previous year, with ninety-seven percent of cases going unsolved. They would soon get worse, as motorcycle gangs in civilian clothes began attacking and shooting unarmed citizens, particularly youngsters, with the security forces standing by.
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| 14 |
ID:
151236
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| Summary/Abstract |
The deterioration of Venezuelan democracy that precipitated Chavez's rise and then worsened under his rule has devolved into a turn toward outright authoritarianism under Maduro.
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| 15 |
ID:
118275
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the opposition to win, the regime must become fairer and more democratic, the ruling party must split, and the opposition must remain united.
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