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ID:
119420
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 10 June 2000, a group of roughly 200 mourners assembled at the Zentralfriedhof Berlin-Friedrichsfelde, the traditional resting place for those belonging to Germany's Communist pantheon beginning with Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. The occasion was the burial of Erich Mielke, the longstanding head of East Germany's Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Ministry of State Security; MfS or Stasi) who had died the previous month of natural causes at the age of 92. Willi Opitz, the last rector of the MfS Juristische Hochschule (School of Law), headed the delegation and delivered the main eulogy. In the course of Opitz's remarks, Mielke was praised for his "energetic preservation and assertion of socialist law not only in our ministry but in all areas of state and society." In addition to his desire that "people live and work in security and dignity," he himself "radiated optimism, strength, and zest for life." Even after 1989-confronted by "prejudices based in revenge and victors' justice, degrading penal conditions, [and] the revocation of his entitlement to a VVN (Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime) pension"-Mielke remained unbroken. A few words of consolation were also directed at his widow, his son Frank, his adopted daughter Inge, and his two grandchildren, all in attendance.
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| 2 |
ID:
189277
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This article analyzes the quality of selected aspects and issues regarding relations between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and China in the 1950s and early 1960s. How was Chinese dictator Mao Zedong’s Hundred Flowers Campaign perceived and interpreted in East Berlin, and why and until when was GDR leader Walter Ulbricht enthusiastic about Mao’s disastrous Great Leap Forward are among the questions this article will seek to answer. As it turned out, East German leaders’ assessments and newspaper reporting on Mao’s domestic and foreign policy and government propaganda did not in any way correspond with China’s on the ground realities. The East German authorities took Chinese propaganda and entirely false statistics and data on steel and agricultural production at face value and ordered its mouthpiece newspapers to do the same. The same was true for Chinese reporting and propaganda on Ulbricht’s decision to divide Berlin with a wall in 1961: misleading and nonsensical reporting in support of a fair-weather friendship, which in the wake of the Sino-Soviet Split in the early 1960s would turn into enmity (as ordered by Moscow).
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| 3 |
ID:
093678
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The roots of the east's continuing alienation lie in the enforced, prolonged isolation that its society endured during most of the cold war.
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