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| 1 |
ID:
093758
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the creation of modern Iraq in the period between the Armistice of Mudros in October 1918, marking the end of the First World War in the Middle East, and the conclusion of a formal peace treaty with Turkey in 1923. It looks at how far the British occupiers considered the ethno-religious character of the population while defining frontiers and political system in the territory, focusing on the three major ethno-religious groups in Iraq: Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds. It shows that British policy, influenced by the state of Anglo-Turkish relations, the relationship between officials in London and officials in Baghdad, and British economic necessities and public sentiments towards imperialism, evolved through three main phases: progressively, ethnic and religious factors receded in significance.
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| 2 |
ID:
107215
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| 3 |
ID:
163464
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whom do ordinary Syrians support in their civil war? After decades of repression, the Syrian uprising unleashed an outpouring of political expression. Yet the study of Syrian public opinion is in its infancy. This article presents survey evidence from a large, diverse sample of Syrian refugees in neighbouring Lebanon, one of the first of its kind, and examines their support for the different factions fighting in the civil war. In so doing, it demonstrates that many conventional narratives of the conflict are oversimplifications of a more complex reality. The survey shows that the majority of Syrian refugees support one faction or another of the opposition, but a large minority sympathizes with the government. In line with existing accounts of the war, the government draws its popular support base from wealthier and less religious Syrians, as well as minorities. Nonetheless, large numbers of Sunni Arabs also side with the government, belying sectarian narratives of the war. The survey also finds that supporters of the opposition Islamists and non-Islamists are similar in many regards, including religiosity. The main distinction is that the non-Islamist support base is far more politically attentive than are Islamist sympathizers, in contrast to existing narratives of the war.
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