Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
161360
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
2 |
ID:
029311
|
|
|
Publication |
New York, Academic Press, 1972.
|
Description |
ix, 127p.Hardbound
|
Series |
Probability and mathematical statistics: a series of monographs and textbooks
|
Standard Number |
0127101500
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
010241 | 519.7/VAJ 010241 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
3 |
ID:
160995
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
Using two recently published essays by the current writer that assesses the dismal record of performance of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in enabling communist legacy defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe to develop viable defence plans, this essay argues the need for deep reforms in the region’s defence institutions. To guide this reform effort, pragmatic solutions are suggested to improve the ability of these organisations to produce viable defence plans. Recommended reforms are: (1) conduct conceptual and cultural “audits,” (2) make operational and financial data central to decision-making, (3) change current organisational sociology, (4) examine planning methods and practices, and (5) stress the need to adopt policy frameworks to drive the operation of defence institutions.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
ID:
144417
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
Breakthroughs in artificial intelligence will generate unprecedented opportunities, but they will also create hard-to-predict risks. Sam Winter-Levy and Jacob Trefethen argue that governments, universities, and private companies need to take notice now and begin to work together to address the accidental consequences that may accompany the onset of new smart technologies of immense power.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
5 |
ID:
149014
|
|
|
Summary/Abstract |
Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of conformance with them. The article concludes with specific and detailed recommendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|