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| 1 |
ID:
106143
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article offers a commentary on the push and pull framework outlined by Morselli, Turcotte and Tenti in the current issue of this journal. It argues that, when assessing the mobility of criminal groups, two key aspects deserve better recognition: first, the nature of the movement, namely whether the common fund and the 'headquarters' (including the boss) have been shifted from the old to the new locale; second, whether the group provides some kind of goods and services or is purely predatory. It maintains that both push and pull factors may vary according to those characteristics. Finally, the article empirically examines the movement of a Camorra crime group from Campania (Italy) to Scotland and the Netherlands, and reconstructs the underlying push and pull factors.
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| 2 |
ID:
074775
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2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
More than most issues surrounding the American Mafia, the history of the Castellammare War is contestable at both theoretical and empirical levels. As the alleged pivotal event in the creation of the contemporary structure of the US Mafia or Cosa Nostra, it is of obvious importance as a topic of historical investigation. But a survey of published works on the War and its consequences reveals confusion, inaccuracies, erroneous assumptions and missing information. This is the first major systematic attempt to explore the War and its consequences made since the 1970s. Aside from adding substantially to the stock of knowledge of the War and its participants, debates on the War are critically evaluated, using original source materials where possible. The Castellammare War did not have the ramifications assumed, when placed either in a broader context or from the vantage point of internal American Mafia dynamics.
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| 3 |
ID:
111818
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| 4 |
ID:
056537
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| 5 |
ID:
103551
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| 6 |
ID:
076812
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| 7 |
ID:
039437
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| Publication |
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.
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| Description |
xiv, 199p
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| Standard Number |
0710074719
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 010924 | 364.106/JAN 010924 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 8 |
ID:
078095
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| 9 |
ID:
066298
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| 10 |
ID:
193131
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| Summary/Abstract |
In Indonesia, “land mafias” (mafia tanah) proliferate, alongside mafias that cluster around other commodities and state functions. We analyze the composition, character, modes, and sources of resilience of Indonesian land mafias, noting similarities with formations elsewhere, especially India. While taking care to avoid reifying the category, we view land mafias as opportunistic networks, or assemblages, of diverse actors including land brokers, investors, lawyers, gangsters, bureaucrats, law enforcement officers, and politicians. Their goal is to harvest rents from the transfer of ownership and control over land. They feature two elements: first, reliance on coercion (not always physical violence but always entailing transfer of property without freely-given consent, often via fraud or manipulation); second, institutional amorphousness crossing the state-society boundary. We analyze four modes of land mafia operation, though their nebulousness defies easy categorization. In explaining land mafia resilience, we acknowledge Indonesia’s property boom as a driver, but note that the ubiquity of mafias points to a more fundamental explanation: a variety of state formation involving pervasive engagement by state actors in illegal behavior in collusion with wealthy private actors. Mafias are central to Indonesian state formation, rather than aberrations. Feedback loops that incentivize illegal behavior make land mafias difficult to eradicate.
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| 11 |
ID:
106144
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article starts by offering comments on the framework proposed by Carlo Morselli, Mathilde Turcotte and Valentina Tenti for understanding the factors underlying the mobility of organised crime groups. It then presents a modified framework, consisting of three elements: 'supply', 'local conditions' and 'demand for mafia protection'. The article continues by applying the new framework to several cases and concludes with recommendation for future research and for policy makers.
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| 12 |
ID:
118862
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| 13 |
ID:
013793
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| Publication |
Jan-March 1992.
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| Description |
39-51
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| 14 |
ID:
112963
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Entire generations of people born in the former Soviet Union would wholeheartedly support unification, but a logical question arises: With whom are we going to unite? A country that has assimilated the worst from Western capitalism, rampant with xenophobia and domestic racism, and which is suffering from a demographic and technological decline? A country whose economy is controlled by the mafia and oligarchs?
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| 15 |
ID:
089960
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the decisions of the internal corruptors in fixing football games. The methodology is a mixture of interviews, database analysis and examination of a specific series of taped phone calls of a corrupt Russian football official. It finds that generally, this type of match-fixing occurs only after a specific point in the season. There are five implicit questions that corruptors must answer: is the game important enough to fix? Is it morally ethical? Can my team win honestly? Can I afford to fix the game? If I am caught is there a high risk of sanctions? The second section of the paper examines the question of who to bribe? The data indicate that out of the three possible options - referees, players and team officials - the best chance of delivering a successful fix are the team officials. The final section is an examination of the use trust, favour banks and guarantors among the team officials who are willing to sell matches.
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| 16 |
ID:
102082
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents the Mafia Index (MI), an index measuring the presence of mafias at the provincial level. In the abundant literature on Italian mafias, relatively few studies have attempted to measure the presence of mafias across the country. A review of previous attempts points out the limitations and methodological shortcomings of existing measurements. The study provides an operational definition of 'mafia' and selects the most appropriate indicators and variables according to multiple criteria. The MI combines data on mafia-type associations, mafia murders, city councils dissolved for infiltration by organised crime, and assets confiscated from organised crime and covers the period between 1983 and 2009. The MI highlights not only the strong concentration of the mafias in their original territories but also their significant presence in the central and northern provinces. This confirms that mafias should not be regarded as typically Southern Italian phenomena, but rather as a national problem.
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