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| 1 |
ID:
031776
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Himalayan Books, 1984.
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| Description |
176p.pbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 024888 | 956.048/MEH 024888 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
103435
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| 3 |
ID:
128638
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The author, in a three part series examines the evolution of naval warfighting doctrine, with examples, and seeks to set out a grammar of doctrine.
Within the context of the present highly complex and shifting environment and in the face rapid technological change, it is not unreasonable to question the validity of doctrine - Albert Palazzo -2008
Knowing the enemy is the bedrock of the business of strategy: strategic theories in comparison, are second order problems. To concentrate on doctrine before enemies is to put the theoretical cart before the actual horse -a double error - Ken Booth, 1979
Doctrine is the box outside of which we need to think- Colonel Rory Copinger, Symes, Royal Marine-2010
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| 4 |
ID:
128659
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the second part of his series of articles, the author examines the development of naval doctrine through the 18th century, culminating in the production and publication of the fighting doctrine which informed the first world war, and governed the conduct of the battle of Jutland in 1916
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| 5 |
ID:
128720
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this the concluding part of his series on the chemistry of doctrine, the author examines the further evolution of naval doctrine during the second world war, with specific reference to the battle of Atlantic . He concludes by surveying the whole three part series and drawing some enduring lessons and principles.
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| 6 |
ID:
104088
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article posits that Alfred Thayer Mahan supplies the "logic" of Chinese maritime strategy, urging Beijing to amass commercial and naval fleets, international commerce, and forward naval stations-the trappings of sea power. Mao Zedong provides the "grammar" by which the People's Liberation Army will prosecute naval operations offshore. The article ranks Wayne Hughes's three generic models of fleet tactics according to Chinese strategic preferences, concluding that Chinese commanders incline to dispersed attack, sequential attack, and massed attack, in that order. By acquainting themselves with Chinese preferences, U.S. naval commanders can glimpse how this prospective naval adversary will wage war.
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| 7 |
ID:
133071
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has been well over a decade since the first “prophets” of information warfare proclaimed a new age of conflict fought not just on air, sea, and land but with electrons in what came to be known as “cyberspace.”1 Since these early predictions, many incidents have confirmed that criminals, random hackers, and government-sanctioned specialists can wreak havoc on governments, military communications systems, and corporations. The Stuxnet worm alone helped delay-by months, perhaps years-the long-standing efforts of Iran to acquire sufficient nuclear material to build nuclear weapons.2 Recent revelations of hacking campaigns against such publications as the Wall Street Journal and New York Times have broadened concerns to include even the integrity of American democratic institutions.3 Meanwhile, the commander of U.S. Cyber Command has characterized cyber attacks designed to gain access to the intellectual property of American corporations as the “greatest transfer of wealth in human history.”
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| 8 |
ID:
130061
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A strategic solution to the troubled waters of the Western Pacific is perimeter defense-but what kind? History offers options.
Want to give China an ulcer, a nagging sore that compels Beijing to think twice about aggression? Then look at the map. Geography affords the U.S.-Japan alliance abundant opportunities to make trouble for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), denying China's military access to the vast maneuver space of the Western Pacific while hampering its movements up and down the Asian seaboard. Fortifying the offshore island chain while deploying naval assets in adjoining waters could yield major strategic gains on the cheap. Doing so is common sense. The only question is how.
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| 9 |
ID:
025940
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| Publication |
London, Macdonald & James, 1978.
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| Description |
xxv, 669p.: mapshbk
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| Standard Number |
0356080900
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 018381 | 956.04/DUP 018381 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
031316
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| Publication |
New York, Bison Bookx Corporation., 1984.
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| Description |
189p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
0600385833
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 026042 | 959.7043/CAR 026042 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
093913
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Years of strategic missteps in oceans policy, naval strategy and a force structure in decline set the stage for U.S. defeat at sea in 2015. After decades of double-digit budget increases, the People's Liberation Army (Navy) was operating some of the most impressive systems in the world, including a medium-range ballistic missile that could hit a moving aircraft carrier and a super-quiet diesel electric submarine that was stealthier than U.S. nuclear submarines. Coupling this new asymmetric naval force to visionary maritime strategy and oceans policy, China ensured that all elements of national power promoted its goal of dominating the East China Sea. The United States, in contrast, had a declining naval force structured around 10 aircraft carriers spread thinly throughout the globe. With a maritime strategy focused on lower-order partnerships, and a national oceans policy that devalued strategic interests in freedom of navigation, the stage was set for defeat at sea. This article recounts how China destroyed the USS George Washington in the East China Sea in 2015. The political fallout from the disaster ended 75 years of U.S. dominance in the Pacific Ocean and cemented China's position as the Asian hegemon.
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| 12 |
ID:
128631
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2013.
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As the fulcrum of economic growth tilts towards the dynamic eastern economies in the 21st century, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has assumed strategic importance. China is making inroads in to the IOR island states with tis weiqi strategy to safeguard and further its interest with its realpolitik of the string of pearls. The author is Vise President of the Indian Maritime foundation and a former DNI and DNO at NHQ as well as author of A Nation and its Navy at War
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| 13 |
ID:
128660
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2013.
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Today Japan faces a myriad of military threats. How it is responding to those through the deployment of naval forces provides a model for other states in the region.
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| 14 |
ID:
032957
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| Publication |
New York, Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963.
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| Description |
89p.Hbk
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| Series |
Military History of World War II
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| Contents |
Vol. XII
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 008104 | 940.54/DUP 008104 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
128664
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A Las my start in HMS Bermuda could have been disastrous. In clearing out the officers files of the previous commission, I had piled these up in the kneehole of my desk, awaiting a chance for them to be destroyed. Now we had in the Captain's office a young sailor - we will call him Snodgrass - who was the messenger.
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| 16 |
ID:
133400
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This was written in response to an article by Jon Parshall that appeared in the Spring 2010 Naval War College Review.1 When I first came across Parshall's article I was interested and even intrigued, but the more I read, the more apparent it became that his work was not sound. One element, I believe, that may have colored what otherwise might have been an objective analysis was Parshall's clearly stated goal to "bury Fuchida." Generally, a biased, set conclusion is not a good starting point for a historical analysis. Good research begins with questions and ends with conclusions, when facts permit. Parshall attempts to make the facts fit his conclusions, and when he cannot, he uses conjecture and assumptions to try to bridge the gap. Throughout his article, Parshall employs a wide variety of euphemisms accusing Fuchida of "lies." One would expect a less snarky, cynical analysis from a historian.
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| 17 |
ID:
133394
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The British naval historian N.A.M. Rodger, in the Hattendorf Prize Lecture last October at the Naval War College, emphasized both the importance of studying history and the perils of misusing the past to analyze current international relations. Historians who use the past to predict the future, he said, are foolish.
"History," he explained, "never repeats itself exactly; historical parallels are never really parallel, and the 'lessons of history' are at best general warnings, not specific instructions.
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| 18 |
ID:
124014
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Undersea warriors must learn from the past while handling a sophisticated network of manned and unmanned platforms and sensors.
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| 19 |
ID:
128661
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reflections arising from the proposed Australian 'Force 2030' submarine programme. Whilst these may seem fanciful and may provoke Australian members, the article offers some unusual thoughts about the Australian defence problem.
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| 20 |
ID:
128662
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A century ago, in August 1913, the Commander in Chief, China Station was Vice Admiral Martyn Jerram. From England via the Atlantic, North America and the Pacific he had arrived at Hong Kong from Vancouver on 14 March 1913 in the CPR steamer empress of India (5,943 grt). There, on 29 March 1913, he assumed command of the station in succession to Admiral Sir Alfred Winsloe who on that day sailed for England in the P and O SS India (7,911 grt.).As befits the era, the wade-Giles from Romanisation is used where relevant.
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