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ID:
127716
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the debate on intelligence contracting, intelligence officers are grouped into two personnel categories characterized by opposing sets of motivations and interests. Government employees are assumed to be motivated by a higher goal related to national security, while intelligence contractors are said to be motivated primarily by pecuniary interests and loyal first and foremost to their shareholders. Contemporary research on human motivation, however, suggests that the two personnel categories are not all that different in that both appear to be intrinsically motivated and loyal primarily to the mission at hand, namely national security. Moreover, comparative research on public organizations and private corporations suggests that there are more similarities between the two than there are differences. This must lead us to re-examine the recent criticism fielded against the practice of intelligence contracting.
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| 2 |
ID:
093924
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This history of intelligence contracting in the United States is in many ways the story of American intelligence itself. For all the current criticism of this "new post-9/11 industry," intelligence contracting pre-existed the creation of formal intelligence bureaucracies and gradually developed from alliance-based intelligence sharing and ad-hoc individual agreements into the increasingly private and corporate companies of today. Most of the criticisms of the field are similarly rooted in history: over the ages, some have been legitimate and others less so. Ultimately, when viewed in context, however, intelligence contracting is not nearly as dark or nefarious as is typically portrayed, but rather has been and continues to be a pillar of American intelligence production.
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