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| 1 |
ID:
093971
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Israel Air Force (IAF), according to conventional wisdom, constituted the decisive element in Israel's victory in the 1967 Six Day War, but had much less of an impact on the state's triumph in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The present article takes issue with this line of thinking, contending that, while the IAF's contributions to the Israeli victories in both wars were quite significant, airpower actually was more important in the latter triumph, but not decisive in either one. The article reaches this conclusion through an in-depth comparison of the IAF's accomplishments (or lack thereof) in both wars.
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| 2 |
ID:
159436
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| Summary/Abstract |
Caught by surprise by the Syrian and Egyptian armies at the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) experienced serious reverses on both the Golan and Sinai fronts during the early days of hostilities but recovered more quickly in the north than in the south. The Israeli government’s prioritization of the Golan front early in the war and the cumulative effects of at least six other variables—terrain, frontline forces, command and control (C2), reserve mobilization, airpower, and combined arms warfare—explain the IDF’s better performance in the north during the early days of the conflict.
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