| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the last two decades, demands for greater international economic organisation (IEO) accountability have been both prominent and vitriolic. This article demonstrates how an influential IEO, the World Bank, took up concerns of its lack of accountability through creating the Inspection Panel in 1993, in response to civil society pressures and member state demands. Drawing loosely on John Campbell's argument that ideas operating in the 'foreground' and 'background' influence policy decisions, it traces how the idea of external accountability gained strength, leading to the Inspection Panel's emergence. This contrasts with competing rational design explanations that derive 16 conjectures to explain why states design the institutions they do. The article proceeds in four parts: first, the basis for examining IEO and World Bank accountability is outlined, before detailing how a rational design argument would apply to the establishment of the Inspection Panel. A constructivist account of how ideas of accountability emerged and shaped the policy formation process is then provided, which establishes a comprehensive explanation of how and why the Inspection Panel was created the way it was and not otherwise. The conclusion then reflects on the importance of the formation of external accountability mechanisms for IEOs and of ideas in shaping international institutions.
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