| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
100056
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
124684
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
When chief of army staff (COAS), General Bikram Singh took over as the head of the 13 lakh strong army on 31 May 2012, he was conscious of the extraordinary circumstances that had preceded his elevation. His predecessor, in his public fight with the government over his age row, had wittingly or unwittingly harmed the army grievously. The manpower, which is the real asset of any professional army, had been compelled to take sides: for or against the army chief, General V.K. Singh. Was their chief working for the army or simply for himself, was the question being discussed, in hushed voices, at all levels, from senior officers' enclaves, to formation and unit messes, junior commissioned officers (JCO) messes, and soldiers' langars. When the senior-most officer becomes suspect, the other officers could no longer remain above board.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
094066
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Russia's war with Georgia highlighted the weaknesses of its armed forces. Recent reforms have sought to redress structural problems, but the political will needed to give Russia a modern, professional army - able to fight limited, regional wars - is still insufficient. Moscow needs to fully embrace the end of conscription, the integration of state-of-the-art military hardware and wider political reform.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
158442
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The earlier work on the optimal design of the national security has focused on the opportunity cost of the draft in terms of foregone human capital formation. The current paper introduces the national security into the welfare analysis missing from the earlier work. This creates a trade-off between the private goods and the security as a public good in the social cost–benefit analysis. There are three major results. First, and arising from the intergenerational interaction, it is optimal to introduce a pay to the young generation when in duty even by resorting to a distortive tax. Second, when optimizing the size of the army, the optimal choice between the draft army and the professional army depends on the risk class of the country. A security gradient arises. Third, the choice is linked to the size and the quality of the reserve generated by the two approaches.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|