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| 1 |
ID:
119558
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| 2 |
ID:
138354
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| 3 |
ID:
095875
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Previous studies of China's local people's congress (LPC) elections have been preoccupied with the description of the new election law, the operation of that law, the control mechanism of local Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committees in the electoral process, electorates and selectorates, and the voting behavior in China's limited-choice election. Less scholarly attention has been paid to the emergence and implications of independent candidates in this electoral setting. Based on interviews, document analysis and observation, this paper defines the independent candidate, classifies them into four types, and describes the campaign process and specific outcomes in China's LPC elections. It is demonstrated that the development of independent candidates forms a realistic power locus in China's LPC elections, and to a large extent provides a functional substitution of opposition parties for exploring the change of authoritarian regime without opposition parties.
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| 4 |
ID:
094108
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper considers aspects of the law and practice governing the nomination and election of judges of the International Court of Justice. The processes have led, over the last 85 or so years, to major changes in the composition of the Court. How are those changes to be related to the changing procedural and substantive challenges faced by the judges? This paper suggests possible, if provisional, answers to that large question, which is to be seen in the context of the long struggle to subject State power to law and legal process.
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| 5 |
ID:
110536
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
We use an agency model to analyze the impact of judicial review on the incentives of elected leaders to "posture" by enacting bold but ill-advised policies. We find that judicial review may exacerbate posturing by rescuing leaders from the consequences of unwise policies, but may also discourage posturing by alerting voters to unjustified government action. We further find that judges will defer to the decision of elected leaders unless posturing is sufficiently likely. We then show how judicial review affects voter welfare, both through its effect on policy choice and through its effect on the efficacy of the electoral process in selecting leaders. We also analyze how the desirability of judicial review is affected by characteristics of the leaders and the judges.
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| 6 |
ID:
119543
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| 7 |
ID:
119512
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