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| 1 |
ID:
191311
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| Summary/Abstract |
Western Denmark is a separate bidding area in the North-Western European power market, Nord Pool. Wind power now exceeds 50% of production annually in Western Denmark. Hourly market data from 1999 onwards are publicly available from the Danish TSO. In this paper, we analyse these data for 2009–2021. Until the energy crisis began in 2021, the Nordic power market has shown relatively stable prices. While extreme events are moderately increasing, the value factor of wind is stable. Thus, the current infrastructure – flexible power plants, interconnectors and electrification of district heating – and market organisation can manage the amount of wind power installed. In other words: 2009–2021 show a well-functioning market economy of dispatch, operating on top of a planned economy of investment.
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| 2 |
ID:
094221
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Deregulation in energy markets has entailed important changes in the way agents conduct business. Price risk arises as a result of fluctuations in the future price of electricity and agents assume long or short positions in the forward and spot markets to hedge their exposure to price risk. The presence of forward risk premium in prices is evidence of the fact that agents act in the market according to risk considerations. This work aims to analyse the information content of the difference between the forward and spot prices (the so-called forward premium) regarding the agents' decisions. We find that the sign and magnitude of the ex post forward premium depend on the unexpected variation in demand and on the unexpected variation in the hydroelectric capacity, and that both the ex post and the ex ante forward premia are negatively related to the variance of spot price, as Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) predict. We provide additional insights about relevant aspects of spot price pricing in the Spanish electricity market such as the positive relation between spot prices and CO2 emission allowance prices or the impact on spot prices of the set of market matching rules introduced in March 2006.
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| 3 |
ID:
176797
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How much carbon is in the price of power? The answer to this question determines many economic consequences of climate policies, i.e. in terms of costs for downstream industries. It requires, however, to first identify the cost impact of carbon pricing on the price-setting entity on the power market. Economic theory tells us that power prices are determined by the cost of the marginal plant. We propose two simple approaches to conclude on marginal technologies in electricity wholesale from public data. Both approaches are complementary, easy to implement, and based upon assumptions which are commonly used in more complex energy system models. We exemplify their use with a policy example on the compensation for indirect emission costs from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. We find that the current policy design severely overweighs CO emissions from lignite power plants in the Central Western European power market, which may lead to overcompensation of industrial power users and therefore to a distortion with regard to the policy’s stated goal.
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| 4 |
ID:
105740
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
African power sectors are generally characterised by insufficient generation capacity.
Reforms to address poor performances in the 1990s followed a prescribed evolution towards power markets that would allow wholesale competition amongst generators and so lead towards efficiency improvements. Despite reforms being embarked, competitive power markets have not been established in Africa; rather, the result has been the emergence of hybrid markets where state-owned generators and IPPs operate devoid of competition; and although IPPs have emerged in a number of African power sectors, many countries still do not have sufficient generation to meet their electricity demands.
This paper investigates the development of private generation power projects in Africa by analysing data collected from both primary and secondary sources in four case studies of power sectors in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco and Tunisia. It identifies how planning and procurement challenges have lead to difficulties in adding sufficient generation capacity in a timely manner, exacerbating the problem of insufficient generation capacity in Africa. It provides suggestions as to how these frameworks could respond more effectively to the capacity challenges faced by hybrid electricity generation markets, and how broader power sector reforms should be guided to reflect the challenges of hybrid markets better.
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| 5 |
ID:
174954
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's electricity demand has grown rapidly over only two decades and is currently the largest in the world. This was largely owing to a framework of regulation in which governments regulated prices and quantities, and there was ample incentive for investment. As the growth in electricity demand has slowed and the use of renewable energy has been impeded by integration-related challenges, China has embarked on a new round of power sector reform, with a focus on market construction. Considering four years of market experiments at the provincial level, we review the backgrounds and goals of the reforms, as well as the current progress toward meeting the initial targets. Then, we discuss the key challenges to be overcome to achieve complete implementation of the reforms, with special emphasis on the system of dispatch. We recommend that China's reforms, in order to achieve the goal of market-based competition, must embrace short-term markets, a greater role for independent regulation, compatibility with renewable energy, and inter-provincial coordination.
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| 6 |
ID:
149982
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| Summary/Abstract |
The European Union took more than 20 years to start defining a common market design for its internal electricity market: a European Power Target Model. And, a further 10 years to fully implement it. Meanwhile, the reference generation set of that model has shifted from CCGT burning gas to RES plants transforming intermittent natural resources. Could the existing EU target model continue to work well for the short- term operation and long-term investment? If not, can the existing EU institutions easily produce an “RES resilient” new power target model?
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| 7 |
ID:
105816
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Emission trading programs (C&T) and renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are two common tools used by policymakers to control GHG emissions in the energy and other energy-intensive sectors. Little is known, however, as to the policy implications resulting from these concurrent regulations, especially given that their underlying policy goals and regulatory schemes are distinct. This paper applies both an analytical model and a computational model to examine the short-run implications of market interactions and policy redundancy. The analytical model is used to generate contestable hypotheses, while the numerical model is applied to consider more realistic market conditions. We have two central findings. First, lowering the CO2 C&T cap might penalize renewable units, and increasing the RPS level could sometimes benefit coal and oil and make natural gas units worse off. Second, making one policy more stringent would weaken the market incentive, which the other policy relies upon to attain its intended policy target.
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