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| 1 |
ID:
115322
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Previous attempts to explain US policy towards Iraq from 2003 onwards have understood US intentions and actions through a coherent, rational-utility-maximizing model of the state. This article seeks to de-centre this rationalist explanation by examining the ideational drivers that shaped the Bush administration's understanding of Iraq and hence its policy towards the remaking of its post-invasion politics. In order to gain ideational coherence, both the Iraqi Ba'ath Party and the Sunni community were understood through a 'diabolical enemy image' schema. As a consequence, an 'exclusive elite pact' was constructed, a post-war political system specifically built to exclude former members of the Ba'ath Party and marginalize the participation of the Sunni community. This policy of exclusion drove the country into civil war. One side, Iraq's new ruling elite, fought to impose a victor's peace, the violent suppression of former members of the old regime. On the other, those excluded launched an insurgency to overturn the post-war political order.
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| 2 |
ID:
129241
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| 3 |
ID:
108520
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| 4 |
ID:
111255
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Baath Party has ruled Syria with an iron fist since the 1960s, curbing civil liberties and imprisoning and executing anyone who dared oppose its rule. A major anti-Baath struggle erupted in the 1980s as Syrians rebelled, trying to topple the repressive regime. The ruling party violently suppressed dissidents and maintained its death grip on power. The 2011 public uprising against the regime was significant in its countrywide scope. Inspired by the fight of people throughout the Arab world, it challenged the authority of the despotic leader. Disenchanted Syrians organized protest rallies, demanding demonstrable change and freedom and an end to decades of repressive rule - a struggle whose successful conclusion depends on the resiliency of oppressed and dispossessed Syrians and the alignment of their cause to the self-serving interests of foreign parties able to lend them support in their struggle against the Baathist rule.
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| 5 |
ID:
122754
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| 6 |
ID:
094455
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 2003 Paul Bremer issued CPA Orders to exclude from the new Iraq government members of the Baath Party (CPA Order 1) and to disband the Iraqi Army (CPA Order 2). These two orders severely undermined the capacity of the occupying forces to maintain security and continue the ordinary functioning of the Iraq government. The decisions reversed previous National Security Council judgments and were made over the objections of high ranking military and intelligence officers. The article concludes that the most likely decision maker was the Vice President.
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