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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
115097
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the public diplomacy of one of Canada's first real public diplomats, Paul Martin Sr., who Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau appointed Canada's high commissioner to Britain in 1974, a bittersweet reward for almost 40 years' work in Canada's Parliament. It traces Martin's efforts to stop British authorities from moving Air Canada's landing rights from London's Heathrow Airport to remote, suburban Gatwick. It opens with a discussion of Martin's views on public opinion, focussing on his firm belief in the value of an informed public in shaping the policy-making process. These ideas inspired his diplomacy in Britain, where he set about re-building Canada's public profile, which had sagged during the 1960s and early 1970s. When his initial private efforts to resolve the looming Anglo-Canadian dispute over landing rights at Heathrow Airport failed, he moved the fight into the public realm. Explored here are his tactics and the messages he used to win over the British public to the Canadian cause, forcing the British government to retreat and preserving Air Canada's landing rights at Heathrow.
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| 2 |
ID:
094607
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| 3 |
ID:
164372
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| Summary/Abstract |
Canadian international history is currently enjoying an Asian moment. A handful of younger scholars have cast their attention eastward, generating exciting new work on Canadian relations with specific countries and regions across the Pacific region. This article draws on some of their work, as well as the author’s own long-standing research on Canada’s Department of External Affairs, to weigh the Pacific’s changing importance to Canada. The article argues that the domestic and foreign policies of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, elected in 1968, were truly transformational. Trudeau swept away the traditional hesitations and confining North Atlanticism that characterized the diplomacy of his postwar predecessors. Instead, he pursued a full-throttled policy of strategic engagement that repositioned Asia front and centre of contemporary Canadian foreign policy.
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| 4 |
ID:
146498
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This paper re-examines Canada’s response to the Suez Crisis within the context of its overall approach to the Middle East in the early 1950s. It reminds contemporary readers that most Canadian policymakers, including Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, viewed the distant and unfamiliar region with reserve, as one better left to the Great Powers to sort out. That view only changed in 1956, when the Suez Crisis, Anglo-American discord, and the possibility of nuclear war threatened Canadian strategic interests, transforming Canada into a small regional stakeholder.
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| 5 |
ID:
138291
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| Summary/Abstract |
Three times in the span of 12 years (1968–1980), the foreign policy of the Canadian government was subjected to review by the Department of External Affairs. Although only the first of these efforts resulted in a white paper formally tabled as such in the House of Commons, subsequent reviews tended to follow the design of the first: a comprehensive examination of all aspects of the country’s foreign policy, led and coordinated by senior officials in External Affairs, drawing to varying degrees on expertise from other government departments and the private sector. In all cases, the reviews were intended to produce a document that would guide future policy. They served as useful tools not only for new governments seeking to differentiate their policies from those of their predecessors, but also for those in search of answers to challenges arising in the course of their mandates. This article analyzes the reviews undertaken between 1968 and 1980 and the circumstances that gave rise to them in an effort to account for the popularity of the white paper process among policymakers and to explore the process’s influence on policies subsequently pursued.
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