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| 1 |
ID:
094738
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The literature on conflict and terrorism has paid little attention to the economic costs of terrorism for the perpetrators. This article aims to fill that gap by examining the economic costs of harboring suicide terror attacks. Using data covering the universe of Palestinian suicide terrorists during the second Palestinian uprising, combined with data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey, the authors identify and quantify the impact of a successful attack on unemployment and wages. They find robust evidence that terror attacks have important economic costs. The results suggest that a successful attack causes an increase of 5.3 percent in unemployment, increases the likelihood that the district's average wages fall in the quarter following an attack by more than 20.0 percent, and reduces the number of Palestinians working in Israel by 6.7 percent relative to its mean. Importantly, these effects are persistent and last for at least six months after the attack.
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| 2 |
ID:
188409
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| Summary/Abstract |
With more than ten thousand casualties, the ongoing hybrid Ukrainian war between pro-Russian separatists and the government in the Donbass region, Ukraine’s productive core, has taken a severe toll on the country. Using cross-country panel data over the period 1995–2017, this paper estimates the causal effects of the Donbass war on Ukraine’s GDP. Our counterfactual estimation by the synthetic control method shows that Ukraine’s per capita GDP foregone due to the war amounts to 15.1% on average for 2013–2017. Separate analysis for the affected regions of Donetsk and Luhansk indicates an average causal effect of 47% for 2013–2016. Results are robust to pre-war confounds, namely, the Orange Revolution and Ukrainian-Russian gas disputes. As such, we discuss mechanisms underlying the war’s causal effects on economic performance, which is of broader relevance for debates on the role of government in hybrid conflict management.
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| 3 |
ID:
095045
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper defines the global economic costs of conflict and suggests two key criteria, namely comprehensiveness and consistency, which are necessary for a valid calculation of such costs. A critical review of the literature reveals that most studies focus on national income losses, using counterfactual regression models, finding a negative impact on growth both for conflict countries themselves and for their neighbors. However, the debate is quite fragmented and the literature fails to combine these insights in a comprehensive and consistent manner. Furthermore, there is little work thus far on integrating aggregate and micro-level estimates of the costs of conflict.
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| 4 |
ID:
156916
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| Summary/Abstract |
Data from 117 countries over the period 2006 to 2011 are used to estimate a macroeconomic cross-country system of equations that examines the association between terrorism, self-reported life satisfaction, and national income. Results indicate that terrorism is negatively associated with life satisfaction, whereas no such association is found between terrorism and real GDP per worker. Stark contrasts are found, however, between OECD and non-OECD members. In all, our results suggest that the social costs of terrorism are potentially much higher than the economic costs, and measuring only the conventional economic costs of terrorism significantly underestimates the true costs.
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| 5 |
ID:
150927
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| Summary/Abstract |
Jordan plans to import two conventional gigawatt scale nuclear reactors from Russia that are expensive and too large for Jordan's current electricity grid. Jordan efforts to establish nuclear power might become easier in some ways if the country were to construct Small Modular Reactors, which might be better suited to Jordan's financial capabilities and its smaller electrical grid capacity. But, the SMR option raises new problems, including locating sites for multiple reactors, finding water to cool these reactors, and the higher cost of electricity generation. Jordan's decision has important implications for its energy planning as well as for the market for SMRs.
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