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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
094826
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines, from an Israeli counterterrorism and legal perspective, the evolution of Israeli "targeted killings" (TK) as distinct from past "assassination" and "liquidation" operations. The article traces the evolution using distinct phases. In phase one, the article briefly traces the history of targeted operations, beginning with the Yishuv in the 1920s, working forward to the outbreak of the al-Aqsa armed conflict in 2000. The study then shifts to phase two, the most critical aspect of the story of TKs-the radical changes that occurred as a result of the consequences of the Thabet Thabet Operation in December 2000, showing precisely how, when, and why Israeli furtive "assassinations" morphed into overt TKs. The third phase describes the radical changes and reactions of the Thabet Thabet Operation; of how it marked the end of the quasi-institutionalization of "assassinations" and "liquidations" and began the path to the legalization of a progressively expanded counterterrorism tactic. The study then shifts to the fourth phase, which describes how the creation of an Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) "legal opinion" eventually led to the Israeli High Court of Justice's (HCJ) 2006 verdict on TK. It also covers how the Israeli decision-making process on TK evolved. Finally, phase five analyzes the aftereffects of the HCJ's decision on TK, which is ultimately a consequence of the December 2000 Thabet Thabet operation. Lacking a contemporary historical understanding of this operation and its consequences, the tactic cannot be wholly understood. The purpose of this article is to offer an understanding of how TKs differ from past targeted operations and why they evolved, terminologically, legally, and operationally, specifically as a result of the Thabet Thabet Operation.
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| 2 |
ID:
111221
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Moshe Dayan was Israel's most influential and original soldier. He shaped the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF's) culture first as chief of staff in the 1956 campaign and later as defense minister during both the conventional wars of 1967 and 1973. However, before, between, and during these large conventional engagements, the IDF conducted 'Current Security Operations,' small military operations against Arab insurgency. After 1967, the IDF faced the challenge of controlling the population in West Bank and Gaza. Moshe Dayan was instrumental in setting the policy toward the population from the foundation of the IDF to the crucial time after 1967; his ideas on and practices in counterinsurgency form a tradition in themselves. Dayan's attitude toward the population developed first under the mentorship years of Charles Orde Wingate, the British Army, and the Palmach (the Jewish strike units) during the British mandate in Palestine; then the reprisals period in the early 1950s, subsequently as a reporter and an observer in Vietnam in 1966, and finally in the 'open bridges policy,' developed by Dayan immediately after the Six-Day War.
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| 3 |
ID:
106441
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At their final training session, soldiers at the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) close-combat instructors' course are faced with an extreme situation. Clad in full protection gear, they must face consecutive opponent and fight until they can fight no more. The training setting presents to the soldiers a dilemma epitomized in the instructor's question ''Do you want to quit?'' The author argues that the question, as well as, the situation as a whole presents the trainees with a paradox that seems at first to be a moral dilemma. However, since the training setting simulates real battle, the question which also has an existential facet, is in fact a pseudo moral dilemma, reversing the order of self-interest and self-regard.
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| 4 |
ID:
139027
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| Summary/Abstract |
National security has defined the Israeli experience for nearly seven decades. Yet, in the face of threats ranging from low-level terrorism to existential nuclear dangers, Israel has never adopted a formal national-security strategy. Founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion was the only sitting leader to develop one, and though it was never formally enshrined, the ‘Ben-Gurion doctrine’ remains Israel’s closest equivalent to a national-security strategy to this day. The defence components of that doctrine were based on three fundamental pillars, commonly known as the ‘three Ds’: deterrence of possible threats; detection, meaning early warning of impending attacks in the event that deterrence failed; and decision, meaning decisive military defeat of the enemy. In recent years, a fourth pillar has been added – defence – though it remains controversial, and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have yet to fully adapt to its implications.
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