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| 1 |
ID:
169720
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| Summary/Abstract |
The regulated price mechanism in China's power industry has attracted much criticism because of its incapability to optimize the allocation of resources. To build an “open, orderly, competitive and complete” power market system, the Chinese government launched an unprecedented marketization reform in 2015 to deregulate the electricity price. This paper examines the impact of electricity price deregulation at the industry level. We first construct two-stage dynamic game models to portrait the interaction between the coal and coal-fired power industries. Using the models, we compare analytically the equilibriums with and without electricity price regulation concerning electricity price, electricity generation, coal price and coal production. The theoretical analyses find three regulated electricity price intervals that differentiate the reform impacts. Afterward, we collect empirical data to estimate the model parameters. The influences on the two industries in terms of market outcome and industrial profitability are simulated. Our results suggest that the current regulated electricity price falls within the medium interval, which means deregulation will result in higher electricity price but lower coal price, less coal production and less electricity generation. The robustness analyses show that our results hold with respect to the electricity generation efficiency and price sensitivity of electricity demand.
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| 2 |
ID:
094903
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates the deregulation of the Swedish electricity industry as a political process. Discussions about deregulation started in the late 1980s. A first step in the process was the corporatization of the Swedish state-owned utility Vattenfall in 1992. The deregulatory process culminated with the new Electricity Law, which entered into force in 1996. We investigate in historical depth how a diverse range of actors contributed to shaping both the new institutional environment and the political discourse. The article scrutinizes not only the formal political decision-making process and the activities of a variety of ministries, boards and agencies, but also the processes by which energy companies and other relevant industrial actors influenced the outcome of the regulatory reforms. We explicitly focus on activities taking place on both political and business arenas, showing that major stakeholders acted on several arenas simultaneously to influence the deregulatory process and that the large power companies were most skilful in doing so. We also show that activities on the political and business arenas mutually reinforced each other in shaping the new regulatory framework.
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