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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
094937
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The new ETS Directive defines three different allocation rules, granting exemption from auctioning to those sectors exposed to the risk of Carbon Leakage. This article analyses the inconsistencies that characterize this new allocation rule and it concludes that the methodology designed to assess the risk of Carbon Leakage is more politically driven than economically grounded. The results of the Carbon Leakage risk assessment reveal that grandfathering is going to be the dominant allocation rule during the third phase also. However, not only the exemption from auctioning is unlikely to mitigate Carbon Leakage, instead of improving the allocation transparency and granting harmonization of higher rules but also the new ETS allocation rule is likely to increase the distortions of competition, worsening rather than improving the harmonization within the ETS.
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| 2 |
ID:
137684
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| Summary/Abstract |
Italy promoted one of the most generous renewable support schemes worldwide which resulted in a high increase of solar power generation. We analyze the Italian day-ahead wholesale electricity market, finding empirical evidence of the merit-order effect. Over the period 2005–2013 an increase of 1 GWh in the hourly average of daily production from solar and wind sources has, on average, reduced wholesale electricity prices by respectively 2.3€/MWh and 4.2€/MWh and has amplified their volatility. The impact on prices has decreased over time in correspondence with the increase in solar and wind electricity production. We estimate that, over the period 2009–2013, solar production has generated higher monetary savings than wind production, mainly because the former is more prominent than the latter. However, in the solar case, monetary savings are not sufficient to compensate the cost of the related supporting schemes which are entirely internalized within end-user tariffs, causing a reduction of the consumer surplus, while the opposite occurs in the case of wind.
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| 3 |
ID:
121384
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper considers several policy options which have been proposed to improve the functioning of the ETS. These options require an intervention either on the ETS cap (-30% target, set-aside, carbon central bank, long-term target) or on the carbon price (European and national price floor). We analyse the impact of each policy on the ETS carbon price and emissions. A multi-criteria evaluation method is applied to compare the policy options against a plurality of environmental, economic and procedural criteria. We find that the final ranking depends on the goals to be achieved, i.e., the relative weights attributed to the criteria. When policymakers want mainly to support the carbon price both in the short and long-run, while improving ETS flexibility and harmonization, the CCB and the EU price floor are, respectively ranked as first and second-best options. As the preference for environmental and implementation goals gradually increases, the position of the EU price floor and CCB options tend to invert. The -30% target should be adopted when reducing emissions is the priority goal, while a national price floor is the worst option, in this case. Nevertheless, self-interested States looking for a relatively quick, feasible solution, may find it optimal.
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