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| 1 |
ID:
094951
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
An expedient phase-out of carbon emissions in the electricity sector could be facilitated by imposing carbon fees and applying the revenue exclusively to subsidize new, low-carbon generation sources. Since there would initially be no "new sources," fees would be substantially zero at the outset of the program. Nevertheless, the program would immediately create high price incentives for low-carbon capacity expansion. Fees would increase as new, low-carbon sources gain market share, but price competition from a growing, subsidized clean-energy industry would help maintain moderate retail electricity prices. Subsidies would automatically phase out as emitting sources become obsolete.
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| 2 |
ID:
104925
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This report examines the impact of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and cap-and-trade policy options on the U.S. electricity sector. The analysis uses the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Regional Energy Deployment System (ReEDS) model that simulates the least-cost expansion of electricity generation capacity and transmission in the U.S. to examine the impact of a variety of emissions caps-and RPS scenarios both individually and combined. The generation mix, carbon emissions, and electricity price are examined for various policy combinations simulated in the modeling.
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| 3 |
ID:
126604
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is the first international cap-and-trade program for CO2 and the largest carbon pricing regime in the world. A principle concern over the Emissions Trading Scheme is the potential impact on the competitiveness of industry. Using a panel of 5873 firms in 10 European countries during 2001-2009, this paper seeks to assess the impact of the carbon regulation on three variables through which the effects on firm competitiveness may manifest-unit material costs, employment and revenue. Our analysis focuses on three most polluting industries covered under the program-power, cement, and iron and steel. Empirical results indicate that the emissions trading program had different impacts across these three sectors. While no impacts are found on any of the three variables in cement and iron and steel industries, our analysis suggests a positive effect on both material costs and revenue in the power sector: the effect on material costs likely reflects the costs to comply with emissions constraints or other parallel renewable incentive programs while that on revenue may partly due to cost pass-through to consumers in a market less exposed to competition outside EU. Overall our findings do not substantiate concerns over carbon leakage, job loss and industry competitiveness at least during the study period.
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| 4 |
ID:
169732
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can governments build political support for carbon pricing? This question has challenged policy designers since the earliest programs imposing new prices on pollution, and remains a vital question today. This perspective offers insights on strategies for building greater political support for carbon pricing, based on previous experiences with long-running “auction and invest” programs in the U.S. and abroad, including the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), California's carbon pricing system, and the EU emissions trading system (ETS). Three key insights can be derived from those experiences. First: cap and trade with an auction of allowances is an important option for carbon pricing with distinctive advantages. Second, it is important to generate tangible public benefits from a carbon price that are distributed among citizens in a way that is broadly perceived as fair and addresses potential concerns about higher consumer costs for energy. Third, the most effective form of those public benefits should vary predictably across a few clearly defined categories according to local circumstances.
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| 5 |
ID:
098265
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy. Concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, with a "safety valve" that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level. We find two significant problems, both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase. One is that most important examples of price volatility in cap-and-trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked, but instead when allowance prices collapsed. Second, a single-sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment. We illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one-sided approach.
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| 6 |
ID:
098577
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy. Concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, with a "safety valve" that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level. We find two significant problems, both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase. One is that most important examples of price volatility in cap-and-trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked, but instead when allowance prices collapsed. Second, a single-sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment. We illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one-sided approach.
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| 7 |
ID:
168693
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| Summary/Abstract |
Increased reliance on renewable energy is an important component of the European Union's action plan for reducing carbon emissions. Another key instrument is the European Union Emission Trading System (EU ETS), which caps the overall level of emissions and then permits trade among the emitters.
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