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| 1 |
ID:
192245
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on Turkey’s crisis-ridden years, from 1973 to 1980. As an under-explored era in English language scholarship, it makes a distinct contribution to the literature on pre-1980 coup Turkish politics. In doing so, it illustrates the implications for the democratic order arising from the two central political leaders of the era Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit’s tussle for power across the decade. The study draws on fieldwork interviews and critical reading of Turkish and English sources to reveal new insights into the leaders’ actions and decisions that trapped the country in a state of political paralysis, inflamed left-right violence, and politicized state institutions, ultimately dragging Turkey down one of its most turbulent periods. It illustrates how the leaders played crucial roles in shaping conditions that eventually resulted in the termination of multi-party politics with a military coup on 12 September 1980.
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| 2 |
ID:
095291
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the late 1970s, Turkey experienced a major campaign of political terrorism that was waged by a multiplicity of leftist, ultranationalist, and separatist groups. Between 1976 and 1980, more than 5000 people lost their lives in hundreds of terrorist incidents. The steady escalation of violence amidst a major political and economic crisis undermined the country's fragile democratic system and paved the way for a military coup in September 1980. This study examines the origins and growth of the terrorist movement in Turkey, the main characteristics of political violence, and the causes of the dramatic escalation of terrorism in the late 1970s. The study suggests that although state-sponsored terrorism against Turkey facilitated the rapid proliferation of leftist, rightist, and separatist armed extremist groups, the drift into total terrorism was largely the product of domestic political and social developments.
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