| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In orthodox moral thinking in the West, animals count for something but human interests take precedence. It is argued that this moral orthodoxy or animal welfare position is flawed. It fails to take into account that some animals, like humans, are persons and that some, so-called 'marginal' humans lack personhood. More importantly, although it is likely that animals do not have an interest in liberty for its own sake and have less of an interest in continued life than humans, there is little justification for the animal welfare claim that an animal's suffering should be regarded as less important morally than that of a human. It is concluded that the adoption of a 'sentiency position', whereby animals have a right not to suffer, has radical implications for the way animals are treated, ruling out intensive forms of animal agriculture and those scientific procedures that inflict suffering as morally illegitimate.
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