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ID:
184729
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyses the intricate relationship between sanction-based accountability and bureaucratic shirking. Drawing on an original survey conducted among Chinese civil servants, it addresses the question of whether sanction-based accountability can effectively regulate the conduct of public officials and provide a cure for bureaucratic shirking. The study identifies the characteristics of shirking behaviour in the Chinese bureaucracy and distinguishes three major patterns: evading responsibility, shifting responsibility and reframing responsibility. The findings indicate that sanction-based accountability may contain some obvious and notorious slacking types of behaviour, such as stalling and inaction, but government officials may distort or reframe their responsibilities to cope with accountability pressure. Empirical evidence suggests that owing to some “strategic” adjustments in bureaucratic behaviour, flagrant shirking is replaced by more subtle ways of blame avoidance, such as playing it safe or fabricating performance information. Sanction-based accountability therefore does not offer a panacea for bureaucratic shirking.
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| 2 |
ID:
095309
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's civil service reforms sought to improve the performance of civil servants by introducing more competitive selection processes, incentives to reward performance, and tightened monitoring and supervision. The impact of the reforms was undermined by clashes with other policies being implemented at the time and by a failure to address elements of organization culture that have rewarded various forms of illegal behaviour, such as corruption. Empirical material for our study is drawn from government data and the experience of civil service reform in three Chinese urban areas (Beijing's Haidian district, Changchun and Ningbo) since the 1990s.
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| 3 |
ID:
130706
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using the case of Francis Deng as representative of the Secretary-General for internally displaced persons as an example, this article considers how temporary civil servants may become intellectual leaders within the United Nations. During his 1992-2004 tenure, Deng managed to raise assistance and protection expectations for the internally displaced through framing their concerns in the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. He also contributed to legal change through formulating protection and assistance standards-the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The article argues that a combination of three factors enabled him to exercise intellectual leadership. First, his insider-outsider position at the border between the UN Secretariat (the second UN) and the nongovernmental organizations, academic scholars, and independent experts who engage regularly with the UN (the third UN); second, his personal qualities; and third, his effective ways of framing at an opportune moment in time.
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| 4 |
ID:
117715
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The initial paragraphs of this article outline the broad themes of this special section, drawing attention to changing perceptions and definitions of corruption and to corruption prevention practices in Greater China. The remainder of the article focuses on a particular theme: the relationship between conflicts of interest and corruption in both theoretical terms and in its application in mainland China. Conflicts of interest are conceptualized as the incompatibility between the public interest associated with official duties and interests derived from the private domain. Such conflicts do not always necessarily lead to corruption and may be distinguished from it. By examining the way in which they are regulated in China, we argue that although an intricate web of rules has been established, regulations alone cannot guarantee ethically sound behaviour if there is no supportive value framework of like-minded civil servants. Rules require interpretation and if this discretion means that civil servants choose to follow an administrative culture and personal values that conflict with the regulations, they will have little effect. Hard rules may mean soft constraints.
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| 5 |
ID:
191519
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do Norwegian government officials perceive the dilemma between liberty and security after the 2011 terrorist attacks? A survey from 2016 shows that the central government officials’ attitudes are rather similar to the general population. Both are willing to trade individual rights for more societal security. Structural, cultural, and demographic features explain variations in the civil servants’ views. Position and perceptions of crisis management capacity make a difference. Officials responsible for crisis management are more willing to prioritize security. Low conflict, high trust, and a strong identification with central government creates support for security measures. Furthermore, age and gender matter.
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| 6 |
ID:
133235
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
'Mindless' empiricism rules in British central government, bolstered by the use of prerogative powers and the absence of any 'court of appeal' to insist on definitions and uniformities. This gives arguments about quangos-arm's-length bodies-a surreal quality. The Cameron coalition has created many new quangos, while claiming a cull. Unless and until Whitehall acquires, or is forced to acquire, better habits of mind, it may be a waste of time for academics and reformers to prepare taxonomies and call for more administrative rationality.
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