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ID:
188200
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Polity Press, 2021.
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| Description |
xx, 270p.: maps, tables, boxespbk
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| Series |
China Today Series
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| Standard Number |
9781509536337
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 060273 | 327.5106/LAR 060273 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
124263
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Not so long ago, it was common to af?rm that China was the most important development in Africa's politics and international relations since the end of the Cold War. Now, after an upgrade, China is commonly held to be the most important development for Africa in the twenty-?rst century. In a relatively short period of time -Beijing's Year of Africa in ???? was also the year when China's relations with the continent acquired global visibility thanks in large part to the third Forum on China Africa Cooperation- the theme of China-Africa has been catapulted out of the mostly overlooked margins and into the conspicuous mainstream of all kinds of attention. The tour of Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo by China's President Xi Jinping in March ???? and that of US President Barack Obama to Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania some three months later stimulated more attention. It demonstrated the diverse varieties of critical and celebratory interest in media and social media coverage, as well as a growing body of China-Africa ?lms and ?ction.
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| 3 |
ID:
185839
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| Summary/Abstract |
THE EIGHTH FORUM ON CHINA-AFRICA COOPERATION (FOCAC) was held in Dakar on 29–30 November 2021. It saw the Chinese government, 53 African countries and the African Union (AU) Commission meet under the theme ‘Deepen China-Africa Partnership and Promote Sustainable Development to Build a China-Africa Community with a Shared Future in the New Era’. Staged every 3 years, FOCAC is usually an important and high-profile event to take stock of developments in China–Africa relations, but interest in the 2021 Dakar FOCAC was more muted than previously. This reflected its ministerial—rather than heads of state summit—level and the challenges of convening such a meeting during the coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic. It also reflected the comparatively less eye-catching nature of its results, with other media stories, such as the possible Chinese seizure of Entebbe Airport in Uganda, upstaging proceedings.1 Many external reactions to FOCAC’s outcomes could be summarized as less money and more caution from Beijing.
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| 4 |
ID:
102784
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the notion of 'China's exceptionalism' in Africa, a prominent feature in Beijing's current continental and bilateral engagement. 'China's exceptionalism' is understood as a normative modality of engagement that seeks to structure relations such that, though they may remain asymmetrical in economic content they are nonetheless characterised as equal in terms of recognition of economic gains and political standing (mutual respect and political equality). This article considers the burden that the central Chinese government has assumed through its self-construction and mobilisation of a position of exceptionalism and, concurrently, the imperatives that flow from such rhetorical claims of distinctiveness in terms of demonstrating and delivering difference as a means to sustain the unity and coherence of these rhetorical commitments.
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ID:
095346
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2009.
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China has developed a more consequential role in Sudan over the past two decades, during which it has become bound up in the combination of enduring violent internal instability and protracted external adversity that has characterized the politics of the central state since the 1989 Islamist revolution. Two inter-related political trajectories of China's Sudan engagement are examined here. The first concerns Beijing's relations with the ruling National Congress party in incorporating China into its domestic politics and foreign relations amidst war in Darfur, to which Beijing has responded through a more engaged political role. The second confronts the practical limitations of China's sovereignty doctrine and exclusive reliance upon relations with the central state. Following the peace agreement of 2005 that ended the North-South war, and motivated by political imperatives linked to investment protection concerns, China has developed new relations with the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan, thus seeking to position itself to navigate Sudan's uncertain political future.
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| 6 |
ID:
117789
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| 7 |
ID:
139548
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores China's engagement with the development of norms on security in Africa, with particular attention to its changing post-conflict engagement. Applying the gradualism characteristic of its approach to policy formulation and implementation, the Chinese policymaking community is playing a key role in seeking to redefine the contemporary international approach to managing African security dilemmas. By reinterpreting concepts such as liberal peacebuilding, Chinese policymakers have begun a process of reframing established norms on security and development that are more in line with its principles and core interests. This agenda in the making has enabled the Chinese government to move beyond the constraints of a rhetoric rooted in non-interference in domestic affairs that prohibited involvement in African security issues to a set of practices that allows China to play a more substantive role in security on the continent.
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