| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
When states collapse, so do the most obvious obstacles to violent extremism in their territory. Extremists seem free to recruit and operate from these areas without interference from state security forces. In reality, however, state collapse creates as many constraints as opportunities for extremists. This paper problematizes the commonly held view that there is a strong link between state collapse and the rise of extremism, in particular Al Qaeda-linked extremism, that creates security threats worldwide. By comparing the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in Somalia and Al Qaeda in Iraq in Iraq, the paper discusses the implications of state collapse for Islamist extremism. Our empirical analysis suggests that although there is a correlation between state collapse and an increase in Islamists' appeal and influence, state collapse does not necessarily generate more violent ideologies. Rather, state collapse allows those committed to violence under all circumstances to ally more moderate elements. If the population comes to see the Islamists as destabilizing rather than securing, they may turn on them, leading the moderate Islamists to either break with the extremists, or follow them to the political margins. Similarly, extremists may grow weary of moderate actions, demanding that the group increase its violence and, again, forcing moderates to choose between the extremists' vision and broad political support. Therefore, our main finding is that contrary to the commonly held view, the population of a collapsed state, rather than an extremists' hotbed, can, in fact, be a potentially powerful anti-extremist force.
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