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ID: 144090

Unafraid of the ghost: the victim mentality of Mao Zedong and the two Taiwan strait crises in the 1950s / Yang, Kuisong

Yang, Kuisong	Article
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Summary/Abstract

This article examines the origin of the two Taiwan Strait crises in 1954–1955 and 1958. Whereas the previous literature has focused on how domestic and international factors led to the shelling of Jinmen, this study investigates the effects of Mao’s victim mentality. Like many other intellectuals in the late Qing and Republican eras, Mao was deeply disturbed by the Chinese “century of humiliation,” a historical narrative emphasizing foreign intervention and imperialist aggression. Such feelings of humiliation and victimization were reinforced when the American fleet blocked Mao’s plan to reunify China in the 1950s. It is argued that Mao’s victim mentality was a significant factor contributing to his decision to shell Jinmen twice. By analyzing this case, this article reveals the emotional side of the PRC diplomacy.

Key Words

Mao Zedong ; 1950s ; Victim Mentality ; Two Taiwan Strait Crises ; Domestic and International Factors ; PRC Diplomacy

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ID: 095533

Vacillating between revolution and detente: Mao's changing psyche and policy toward the United States, 1969-1976 / Yang, Kuisong; Xia, Yafeng

Xia, Yafeng	Journal Article
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2010.

Summary/Abstract

After nearly twenty-two years of confrontation and hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), U.S. president Richard Nixon made his historic trip to China and met with Chinese supreme leader Mao Zedong in February 1972. Nixon's one week in China represented a profound turning point in U.S.-China relations. The historic Nixon-Mao handshake stood as a great diplomatic victory for Beijing as well. The Chinese leaders could now focus their attention on the Soviet threat and avoid fighting a possible two-front war. A Chinese Communist party (CCP) Central Committee (CC) document hailed the summit for its success in "utilizing [others'] contradictions, dividing up enemies, and enhancing ourselves," and credited this to Mao's "brilliant decision" to invite the U.S. president.1 Nixon and Mao have often been given credit for achieving U.S.-China rapprochement in the early 1970s. Was Mao really a realistic leader as many have suggested?

Key Words

China ; Mao ; Richard Nixon ; Beijing ; United States - 1969-1976 ; U S - China Relations ;
Chinese Domestic Politics ; United States - 1969–1976 ; Soviet Union

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