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ID: 095611

Constitutional pluralism or constitutional unity: an empirical study of international commitment (1945-2007) / Milewicz, Karolina; Bachtiger, Andre; Nothdurft, Arne

Milewicz, Karolina	Journal Article
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2010.

Summary/Abstract

This article asks whether international law is moving towards a more unified constitutional order or whether differentiated types of constitutional processes are emerging. We study the sequencing and ratification pace of 32 'quasi-constitutional' international agreements containing procedural guidelines for inter-state relations and fundamental human rights provisions for individuals drawn up between 1945 and 2007. We do so in a comparative and quantitative fashion applying sophisticated statistical tools, namely event history techniques combined with counting processes. On the basis of our multi-treaty framework, the findings do not lend support to a unified and quick process of global constitutionalisation. Rather, they provide evidence for the idea of a 'multi-speed globe' of differentiated constitutionalisation. We also make a first attempt to study antecedents to global constitutionalisation. Our findings show that processes of global constitutionalisation vary across regime types and world regions (while there is no effect for new and old states).

Key Words

Constitution ; International Commitment ; Constitutional Pluralism ; Empirical Study ; International Law

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ID: 121845

Mediation and conflict prevention / Eisenkopf, Gerald; Bachtiger, Andre

Bachtiger, Andre	Journal Article
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Publication

2013.

Summary/Abstract

Mediation is a popular process to prevent conflicts over common resources, but there is little clean insight into its effectiveness and mechanisms. Our experimental approach allows for a comprehensive analysis of third-party intervention into potential conflicts and circumvents key problems linked to the analysis of field data. A mediator who credibly threatens punishment in the case of uncooperative behavior achieves the efficient solution in most cases. Similar results are obtained even if the mediator is biased toward one party or has no incentive to intervene. When cooperation fails, communication without credible punishment threats leads to particularly low payouts for the "losing" party.

Key Words

Communication ; Mediation ; Experiment ; Common Resources

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