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| 1 |
ID:
095668
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper attempts to determine the kind of constitutional rule preferred in a young democracy when an institutional opportunity for constitutional change occurs. It adopts the standpoint of collective decision-making. This approach involves two crucial theoretical elements: the calculation of the interests of the political elite and the masses' comprehension of what democracy is. The case studied here is Taiwan's constitutional choice between the direct and indirect election of the president during the period from 1990 to 1994. The paper first examines how the political leaders might have used both the logic of power maximization and of power-loss minimization to choose their position on the issue. It then demonstrates that survey results indeed showed that respondents better understood the direct form of electing the president and therefore supported it over the indirect one. This support helped the direct form to eventually win out.
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| 2 |
ID:
182505
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article deals with the intersecting topics of liberty, democracy, and contentious politics in Czechia in the 1990s. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, Czechoslovakian citizens could once again freely enter the public space and articulate their demands. But what if contentious claim-making acquires intolerant or even violent forms? The author chooses a specific case of skinhead violence and engages with the question of how the borderline between tolerated and forbidden acts was negotiated and reshaped during the democratic transition and subsequent consolidation in Czechia in the 1990s.
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| 3 |
ID:
161559
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| Summary/Abstract |
Existing theories on real exchange rates predict a significant undervaluation of the Korean won (KRW) in the early and mid-1990s. The paper demonstrates why this expectation did not materialize and instead an unprecedentedly large degree of overvaluation took place. Focusing on three variables, namely, financial repression, devaluation pass-through, and policy exhibitionism, the paper examines how the unraveling of the developmental state eventually gave rise to the 1990s’ overvaluation. It argues that the policy exhibitionism of the new civilian government amplified the influence of Chaebol on monetary policies, which in turn created a strong appreciative force to KRW. It also contends that the increasing exchange rate pass-through onto the prices of imported intermediate goods explains why Chaebol did not desire to tame the excessive appreciative trend despite its detrimental effect on their exports. The paper offers policy implications for other state-led, emerging economies.
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