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| 1 |
ID:
189968
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| 2 |
ID:
132003
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The five states that surround the Arctic Ocean- Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Norway-have in recent years taken various measures to protect their economic and security interests in the north. The measures include not only the adoption of Arctic strategies, but also the development of new military capabilities. As in other parts of the world, one state's military efforts to enhance its security may have the unfortunate effect of making others feel less secure, and therefore more likely to undertake similar efforts. Thus, despite being a low-tension region, the Arctic is by no means immune to the logic of the security dilemma.
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| 3 |
ID:
133488
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2009, the United States has released numerous strategic documents outlining the U.S. interests and national objectives in the Arctic. Although these documents recognize increasing interests of the United States in the region, they do not adequately address all the strategic risks at stake in the Arctic and do not provide clear guidance to the Department of Defense for defensive lines of effort. The strategic approach of the United States to the Arctic is one that accepts the current stable and conflict-free Arctic region and assumes that these conditions will remain the same in the future. This outlook ignores important trends that may create challenges for the United States far sooner than national policy makers expect. Without adequate defensive posturing, competition over Arctic resources could present the first direct existential threat to U.S. sovereignty. The four issues at stake that will likely require a combatant commander to use military capabilities to protect U.S. national interests in the Arctic include mineral and resource protection, freedom of navigation, sea lines of communication, and militarization of the Arctic.
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| 4 |
ID:
095978
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| 5 |
ID:
177729
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper presents an analysis of Finland’s Arctic strategy, providing a perspective on contemporary ‘Arctic geopolitics’ outside the dominant emphasis on the territorial politics of the Arctic Ocean coastal states. Concurrently, this serves as an empirical framework for interpreting the contextual de- and re-territorialising manifestations of geopolitical state strategies that are increasingly about securing competitive advantages, rather than exerting or extending territorial control over resources. By deploying the notion of anticipatory geographies this paper shows that Finland’s Arctic strategy documents have produced two intertwined promotional visions that are predicated on the discourses of international competitiveness and which relate Finland to the Arctic region. These are 1) Finland as a key provider of solutions to problems in Arctic development and 2) Finland as an attractive territorial node in ‘Arctic flows’. These anticipatory geographies are facilitated in practice through the political consolidation of ‘Arctic’ markets for Finnish exports and through infrastructure projects purportedly enhancing the position of Finland within various ‘economic flows’. Together, these notions illuminate the geopolitical dimension of attempts to secure competitive advantages and how this relates to the processes of state spatial transformation through de- and re-territorialisation, especially beyond the recently much emphasised context of city-regionalism.
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| 6 |
ID:
165389
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the UK defence secretary’s announcement in September 2018 that the Ministry of Defence is to devise a Defence Arctic Strategy, Duncan Depledge, Klaus Dodds and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe look back on how UK defence has engaged with the Arctic over the past two decades and draw attention to the shift in focus from climate change to hard security threats. They analyse what this means for the development of national Arctic policy in general, including the potential for divergence with other stakeholders such as the Foreign Office and the Scottish government. They conclude by considering how UK Arctic policy might change after Brexit.
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