Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
103843
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Grand strategy is about making sense of complexity; it is the wisdom to make power serve useful purposes. After the end of the Cold War, American policymakers sought to create a new grand strategy for the United States, but they failed in this endeavor. They failed because of difficult domestic and international circumstances. They also failed because of conceptual limitations. This article traces the efforts at strategy formulation in the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, and it analyzes their shortcomings. Bush had process without purpose; Clinton had purpose without process. The article encourages readers to think about how future strategists might improve upon this legacy with clearer and more disciplined attention to priorities, capabilities, and trade-offs. Making grand strategy in a democracy is not easy, but it is necessary. The absence of effective grand strategy in the 1990s contributed to the crises of the early twenty-first century.
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2 |
ID:
096014
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3 |
ID:
103839
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4 |
ID:
103842
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
The perceived history of the Vietnam War profoundly influenced American discussions on grand strategy during the postwar period. The two largest schools of thought, one favoring confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other favoring engagement, drew lessons from the war based upon differing historical interpretations and used those lessons as support beams in constructing grand strategy. Compelling world events during the Carter presidency caused only a few individuals to shift positions in the debate, but one of those individuals was Jimmy Carter himself. Subsequent discoveries by historians indicate that the confrontation school understood the war's history and the postwar world better than did the engagement school and consequently crafted a superior grand strategy. The post-Vietnam debate contains numerous parallels to present-day discussions of grand strategy and offers a variety of lessons salient to contemporary strategic formulation.
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5 |
ID:
101206
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Publication |
2011.
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Summary/Abstract |
The United States has never followed only one grand strategy at a time. In this article, I develop the concept of "hybrid" grand strategies-strategies that vary by time and place, and combine the advantages (or disadvantages) of pure strategic archetypes such as containment, integration, regime change, bargaining, or non-intervention. I argue that hybrid strategies have been ubiquitous in American history, varying more by emphasis and degree than by absolute contrast. Moreover, U.S. hybrid strategies have often succeeded in accomplishing their major goals.
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