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1 |
ID:
181940
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Summary/Abstract |
The stability in the cyber domain is rapidly deteriorating on several fronts marked by increasing sophistication of cyberattacks, declining consensus on global internet governance and intensifying great power competition. These challenges were critical turning points among nation-states to recalibrate prevailing cyber diplomatic engagements. This article investigates the increasing prominence of deterrence in the practice of cyber diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. Using Japan and Australia as case studies, it argues that both states continue to adhere to the conceptual tenets of cyber diplomacy, however, in practice, there is a growing integration of deterrence—cyber capabilities and public attribution/naming and shaming—in the equation at varying degrees and intensities. The article endeavours to make two important contributions: First, revitalize the existing cyber diplomacy framework by challenging the extant literature’s view of deterrence’s limited application—underpinned by cold war analogies—and the implausibility of conducting attribution of cyberattacks. Secondly, evaluate Japan and Australia’s cyber diplomacy based on empirical evidence. Key findings suggest that deterrence reinforces/complements the fundamental elements present in the cyber diplomacy playbook. While slight variation exists, there is a strong acquiescence between Japan and Australia to expand existing cyber cooperation to tackle critical and emerging technologies, supply chain, and data governance.
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2 |
ID:
190074
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Summary/Abstract |
During the Cold War, US extended deterrence commitments mostly focused on deterring nuclear or strategic conventional attacks against allies in Europe and Asia. In the decades following the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the emergence of new technologies and domains for conflict, particularly the cyber domain, prompted new thinking for alliance management and extended deterrence. In this article I explore how the system of US bilateral alliances and informal strategic groupings in the Indo-Pacific affects the crafting of allied cyber deterrence strategies in the region. Based on deterrence and alliance theory, I survey cyber threats faced by US allies and partners in the region and views of cyber deterrence to form a general framework of allied cyber deterrence strategy. The US-South Korea alliance is used as a case study for allied cyber deterrence strategy, with a special focus on the impact that South Korea assuming wartime operational control of allied military forces could have on cyber deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. Just as concepts of extended deterrence had to evolve, the cyber domain will force the United States and allies to reconceptualize peacetime and wartime operational control.
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3 |
ID:
151422
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Summary/Abstract |
This article suggests that there is a paradigm crisis in the sub-field of cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence is evolving slowly and unpromisingly as a strategic tool in both theory and practice, mostly due to the ill-fitting theoretical framework and underlining assumptions it borrows from the absolute-nuclear-deterrence context. Therefore, this article suggests replacing the accepted yet inadequate paradigm of absolute deterrence with a better-fitting restrictive-cumulative-deterrence paradigm that draws on the Israeli approach to deterrence, introducing it into the cyber domain. The article further criticizes the current discourse in the field, including some ‘common knowledge’ (mis)understandings of cyberspace and the ways it affects the possibility of deterrence.
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4 |
ID:
144510
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5 |
ID:
156936
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Summary/Abstract |
Linking deterrence theory to cybersecurity policy and critical-infrastructure protection is easier said than done. Recent cybersecurity incidents involving the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea illustrate the yawning gap between cyber deterrence expectations, applications, and results. This article draws on classical deterrence theory to illustrate how the logic of deterrence applies to cybersecurity policy and strategy. By differentiating between physical and digital critical infrastructure protection, the article explores the promises and pitfalls of cyber deterrence in practice. Seven limitations are explored in detail, including: denying digital access, commanding cyber retaliation, observing deterrence failure, thwarting cyber misfits, addressing the cyber power of weakness, attributing cyber attacks, and solidifying red lines.
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6 |
ID:
122032
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7 |
ID:
112454
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
This article relates American efforts to develop strategic 'cyber deterrence' as a means to deter adversarial actions in and through global cyberspace. Thus far, interests- based cyber deterrence theory has failed to translate into effective American policy and strategy, due to a divergence between the operational idiosyncrasies of cyberspace and an over-reliance on Cold War models of deterrence. Even while explicit cyber deterrence strategy falters, the United States is pursuing a normsbased approach to cyber strategy generally, and hopes to derive deterrent effects from its attempts to broker international agreements pertaining to the 'rules of the road' for the proper and productive use of cyberspace. The United States is not the only norm entrepreneur in this policy space, however, and this article examines how a range of other state and non-state actors are complicating efforts to develop normative regimes that might reduce risks to and from cyberspace. The article concludes that a norms-based approach to cyber deterrence might engender deterrent effects at the state level but is unlikely to do so in the case of 'rogue' states and many non-state actors. States will continue, therefore, to develop punitive deterrence capabilities to respond to these actors.
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8 |
ID:
128107
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
The world is witnessing a remarkable shift in the locus of l=global power with the relative decline of the United States of America and the dramatic rise of China. It is estimated that the rise of India and China will alter the nature of the global system and the global landscape in the coming two decades. During this great geo-political transition period, there is an urgent need to revaluate our theories, paradigms, assumptions and strategies in the light of technological, economic, political and military developments in the region. The heavy dependence of government organizations, business, economic activities and military affairs of information and communication technology by (ICT) necessitates incorporation of cyber technology into our strategic calculation. Cyber power is exerting itself as a key lever in the development and execution of national policy, including counter-terrorism, economic growth, and diplomatic affairs.
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9 |
ID:
162273
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Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2019.
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Description |
xv, 175p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9789386618665
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
059544 | 005.8/SAM 059544 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
059545 | 005.8/SAM 059545 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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10 |
ID:
170580
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Summary/Abstract |
Some risks of ‘persistent engagement’ could be mitigated by reducing its reliance on mixed signals and public communication.
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11 |
ID:
096091
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
The potential for change in increasing rapidly in the 21st century, especially in the information and communication technology (ICT) field. Innovations in ICT are constantly making new breakthroughs and all kinds of technologies, applications and services are being interwoven. Inevitably the broad application of new technologies provides cyber attacks more tools and opportunities to launch attacks. Old information security policies are facing new challenges, emerging threats and unsolved risks. Finding effective solutions
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12 |
ID:
177756
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Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the nature and the desirability of private sector contribution to national strategies of cyber deterrence. The article starts by developing a variation of the concept of cyber deterrence, called RCDC deterrence, which is simultaneously restrictive, comprehensive, dynamic, and complemental. Second, it applies RCDC deterrence to identify and analyze specific areas of cyber deterrence that can benefit the most from private sector contribution. Third, the article cautions about the potential security, legal, and moral issues that could arise from such private contributions. Instead of offering definitive answers on these complex issues, the article ends by suggesting avenues for further research. The ultimate objective is to assist decision-makers in designing policies and regulations aimed at maximizing the benefits of public–private cooperation in cyber deterrence while mitigating its potential downsides.
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13 |
ID:
188342
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Summary/Abstract |
This article explores deterrence as an element in cybersecurity strategy from a small state perspective. The cyber domain presents novel challenges for strategy makers, and applying deterrence in the cyber domain requires an organized and multinational approach – since few states can leverage deterrence in this all-encompassing domain on their own. Deterrence has been an important factor in shaping global security for half a century, but when applied to the cyber domain there are certain inherent mechanisms that must be understood in order to generate the desired effects. Key issues discussed are the volume of agents capable of operating and creating effects in the domain, and the availability of tools and techniques. These issues concerning actors and vectors makes it difficult to survey threats and create targeted deterrence. Furthermore, the cyber milieu makes it difficult to connect action to motives, thereby further complicating any attempt to analyze the actual importance of observable effects. From a strategist’s point of view, these general characteristics are exacerbated by the fact that the international community does not have a common language or shared platform to uniformly approach these issues. Absent clarity on some fundamentals the core issues of attribution and proportionality becomes a hindrance to effective deterrence.
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14 |
ID:
173808
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Summary/Abstract |
When compared to advancements in conceptualising deterrence in other domains, cyber deterrence is still in it messy infancy. In some ways cyber deterrence practice outpaces cyber deterrence theory. Tactics, strategy, doctrine, and policy are developed and put to use even before corresponding theories are properly understood. This article analyses how American cyber deterrence has been implemented over the past two decades in order to inform ongoing debates within the academic study of deterrence, and to provide insights from practice for how cyber deterrence theory can be better conceived and refined.
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