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ID:
108629
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The nuclear security summit process could end in 2014, a top adviser to President Barack Obama indicated last month.
In remarks at an Oct. 7 press briefing at the United Nations, Gary Samore noted that the first nuclear security summit, held in Washington in April 2010, endorsed the plan "to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years," which Obama had announced a year earlier in a speech in Prague. "We do not intend to create a permanent institution with the nuclear security summit," said Samore, the White House coordinator for arms control and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism.
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| 2 |
ID:
110793
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper addresses the issues on nuclear security governance building through
the Nuclear Security Summit. Given the increased threat of nuclear terrorism by
non-state actors, the current global mechanism addressing nuclear security has
revealed serious limitations. Despite various legally binding instruments-such as the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the UN
Security Council Resolution 1540 and other non-legally-binding instruments-global
efforts to address nuclear terrorism have faced serious challenges to their effectiveness.
As a result, after U.S. President Obama's speech in 2009 in Prague, the first Nuclear
Security Summit Meeting was successfully held in Washington, D.C. Based on its
success, the second Nuclear Security Summit Meeting is scheduled to be held in
March 2012 in Seoul, Korea. In addition to the ongoing issues, the Seoul Meeting
will deal with new issues such as nuclear safety in reflection of the 2011 Fukushima
accident. The meeting may also consider discussions on other important issues
such as the framework agreement, involvement of relevant stakeholders, further
institutionalization of the Nuclear Security Summit Meeting and sustainable financing
as long-term agendas. Ultimately, this process will reinforce the effectiveness of the
global efforts to tackle nuclear terrorism and other related issues.
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| 3 |
ID:
184247
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Frustration with large multilateral organizations is on the rise, leading some states to seek consensus in exclusive “minilateral” groupings. However, there is little to no research on how such an organization relates to the broader multilateral regime. I use the case of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) to examine the consequences of exclusion. I find states excluded from the NSS are more likely to criticize the Summits, even where they share policy preferences with included states. A comparison of follow-on initiatives shows that those more associated with the Summits are less likely to gain support from excluded states in the broader regime and that pushback is directly tied to the exclusion of the NSS. This suggests previously underappreciated costs of minilateral organization and the difficulties that can emerge when minilateral organizations attempt to affect a multilateral regime.
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| 4 |
ID:
141684
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On July 31, the United States submitted its instrument of ratification to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), having recently passed the long-gestating necessary implementing legislation.
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| 5 |
ID:
096102
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2010.
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The nuclear security summit held in Washington DC on April 12 and 13, 2010, and focused on how to better safeguard weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to prevent nuclear terrorism. The summit was impressive in terms of the number of participating countries state on American soil since the United Nations was founded in 1945. Leaders from 47 countries and major international organizations such as the UN, the IAEA and the EU attended.
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| 6 |
ID:
129719
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2014.
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The third Nuclear Security Summit will be held in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2014. This visionary nuclear diplomacy will be facing both old and new questions at its third meeting. The basic question relates to the future of the summit process, which has made a significant contribution to international security in a very short span of time. The summit process, however, may serve it better, and the strengthening of the regime must be continued through the next two summits. However, with or without the summit process, the nuclear security regime has to be strengthened. Efforts for nuclear security must continue through proper institutionalisation, keeping the International Atomic Energy Agency at the centre.
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| 7 |
ID:
129717
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article attempts to make a realistic assessment of the danger of nuclear terrorism. While acknowledging the catastrophic consequences of an act of terrorism employing either an improvised nuclear device or a violent attack against a nuclear installation causing spread of lethal radioactivity, it also highlights the complexity of the challenges likely to be confronted by any would-be nuclear terrorist. The article concludes that while there is no room for complacency, and concerted efforts such as the NSS and other global initiatives like GICNT and ICSANT must continue to thwart any possibility of nuclear terrorism, the probability of such a disastrous event remains low.
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| 8 |
ID:
129718
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Nuclear Security Summits are at a midway point but have not yet reached their full potential of eliminating weak links in the global nuclear security system. The first two summits, in Washington and Seoul, have had a beneficial impact by identifying common objectives, galvanising international action and reducing stockpiles of vulnerable nuclear materials. However, improving nuclear security governance is an important new issue. It could be introduced at the 2014 summit in The Hague and be a springboard for action at the 2016 summit in the US. This would produce an NSS legacy of an effective, cohesive and durable barrier against nuclear terrorism appropriate for the realities of the 21st century.
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| 9 |
ID:
131176
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| 10 |
ID:
115802
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| 11 |
ID:
140982
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The 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in The Hague was a resounding success, both in organizational terms and in terms of substance. The new substance can be found in the Communiqué, as well as in innovative joint statements by participants, all of which may be considered as implementation of actions decided upon in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The next two years in the NSS process cannot be business as usual. This viewpoint makes some suggestions for NSS states to undertake between now and the final summit in 2016, including preparations for winding down the NSS process as we know it.
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| 12 |
ID:
131084
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| 13 |
ID:
129720
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| Publication |
2014.
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The threat of nuclear terrorism should not be underestimated because it can have catastrophic effects if and when realised. Nor should the subject matter be politicised beyond a certain point because of its strong espousal by the United States, which has raised suspicions about whether the issue could be used as yet another instrument for asserting American hegemony. Institutionalisation of multilateral actions must therefore be supported and nuclear summit meetings must become the forums for addressing the doubts and concerns relating to the international initiatives.
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