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ID: 168384

Oslo Talks: Revealing the Turkish Government's Secret Negotiations with the PKK / Kadıoğlu, İ Aytaç

Kadıoğlu, İ Aytaç	Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract

This article explores the extent to which the secret talks influenced the path of official negotiations toward ending Turkey's Kurdish conflict, which the scholarly literature has yet to assess. Utilizing interviews with key political actors, this article aims to close this gap by assessing the Oslo talks (2006–2011) as the most comprehensive secret contact between the Turkish government and Kurdistan Workers' Party. It demonstrates that the secret track is not merely a “pre-negotiation” stage aimed at de-escalating the violent conflict ahead of official talks, but also a crucial part of the negotiation stage aimed at establishing a final political agreement.

Key Words

PKK ; Secret Negotiations ; Oslo Talks ; Turkish Government

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ID: 096556

We don’t talk to terrorists: on the rhetoric and practice of secret negotiations / Browne, Julie; Dickson, Eric S

Browne, Julie	Journal Article
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2010.

Summary/Abstract

Political actors sometimes make public commitments not to negotiate with adversaries whom they label as being beneath diplomacy. Such commitments are sometimes made even as they are being broken. Why do actors sometimes publicly denounce adversaries with whom they intend to negotiate? What effect does such prenegotiation rhetoric have on the prospects for successful negotiated settlements? In this paper, the authors present a novel game-theoretic model of conflict bargaining, in which actors can make public commitments not to negotiate before deciding whether to engage in secret negotiations with adversaries. The authors model such commitments as affecting actors' audience costs; a denunciation increases an actor's motivation to reach a negotiated settlement if negotiations are undertaken. Although such a decision weakens an actor's bargaining power, in equilibrium actors sometimes publicly denounce their counterparts. The authors present and interpret equilibrium behavior in their model and discuss the implications of their results for future research.

Key Words

Diplomacy ; Terrorists ; Negotiations ; Rhetoric ; Secret Negotiations

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