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ID:
096590
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
assistance in enforcing administrative decisions. Focusing on court enforcement of pollution levies, this study examines how and why ALL has been employed so extensively by administrative agencies, environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) in this context. The study is based on interviews with judges, EPB officials and polluters involved in court actions as well as court statistical data from 1992 to 2005 for Hubei province. EPBs' heavy reliance on court enforcement for collecting pollution levies and fines resulted from incentives that encouraged the formation of mutually beneficial relationships between courts and EPBs in the 1990s. Court involvement has enhanced EPBs' enforcement powers, but the courts' engagement in enforcement has neither curtailed EPBs' arbitrary exercise of discretionary power nor induced polluters to reduce waste discharges.
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| 2 |
ID:
110435
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese Government recently mandated the installation of continuous emission monitoring systems (CEMS) at state-controlled key polluting facilities in order to provide direct, real-time, continuous measurements of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. By 2010, most coal-fired power plants in China have installed and are operating SO2 CEMS. As China's Central Government strengthens the SO2 control program and implements new nitrogen oxides (NOX) and carbon dioxide (CO2) control programs, the quality of and confidence in CEMS data will become more important. This study utilizes field surveys and existing literature on Chinese CEMS to analyze their operation and management. Our study found that the Chinese government has issued a set of regulations and technical guidance documents to standardize CEMS operation, management, and supervision, and to improve the quality of CEMS data. Many power plants have followed key parts of the national CEMS rules and guidance and are periodically inspected by local environmental authorities. This study suggests several options for addressing some of the gaps and problems with the CEMS operation and supervision and thus enhancing China's CEMS program.
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| 3 |
ID:
155671
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| Summary/Abstract |
The scholarly work on China's environmental regulations in the context of “central–local” relations is dominated by the preference for a centralized approach. This article examines a centrally imposed and executed verification programme of locally reported pollution data, a rare and sustained central effort to enforce an environmental policy, namely the national pollution reduction target system. The programme was established in 2007 to curtail perceived widespread data falsification and to enhance the quality of emission data, the basis for assessing local compliance with targets. Based on an analysis of official documents and interviews with environmental officials and industry representatives, this article found that the verification programme appears to have reduced the overreporting problem with emission data, enhanced local monitoring and enforcement capacity, and to a certain degree deterred violations due to the increased frequency of national and local inspections. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain. Verification is highly resource intensive, it has involved little external oversight and public participation, the central authority has exerted significant yet unchecked discretionary powers, and poor data quality has remained an issue. Over time, the verification programme appears to have turned into essentially a “numbers game.” All those challenges indicate that a centralized enforcement approach is arguably ineffective in addressing China's long-standing problem of weak environmental policy implementation. This study also sheds lights on the classical “principal-agent” theory in the study of public bureaucracy. Not only does the principal distrust the agent, which is the main concern of the theory, but the agent also distrusts the principal.
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| 4 |
ID:
097450
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