| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
115153
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The global climate policy environment is currently characterised by a small number of national or regional 'flagship' emissions trading schemes and a very large number of smaller more targeted 'flotilla' policies. We use an assessment framework to identify the characteristics of policies that affect their likelihood of introduction and alteration during the policy development process. We conclude that this mix of flagship and flotilla policies is at least in part an inevitable consequence of incumbent stakeholder pressure that results in flagship policies being blocked or weakened by those opposing action, and if weakened sufficiently, possibly blocked by those seeking stronger action. In contrast, smaller flotilla policies can be designed to have less impact on large incumbents and/or be of benefit to a different group of stakeholders who then provide political support. As a result, flotilla policies are likely to remain as key elements of the climate policy mix, to reduce emissions beyond those achieved by flagship policies, and to reduce emissions where no flagship policies exist. These findings have two consequences for policy design: the need to ensure that flagship policies do not reduce the effectiveness of flotilla policies, and that flagship policies are capable of being enhanced over time.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
096620
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Average market prices for intermittent generation technologies are lower than for conventional generation. This has a technical reason but can be exaggerated in the presence of market power. When there is much wind smaller amounts of conventional generation technologies are required, and prices are lower, while at times of little wind prices are higher. This effect reflects the value of different generation technologies to the system. But under conditions of market power, conventional generators with market power can further depress the prices if they have to buy back energy at times of large wind output and can increase prices if they have to sell additional power at times of little wind output. This greatly exaggerates the effect. Forward contracting does not reduce the effect. An important consequence is that allowing market power profit margins as a support mechanism for generation capacity investment is not a technologically neutral policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
097462
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2010.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Average market prices for intermittent generation technologies are lower than for conventional generation. This has a technical reason but can be exaggerated in the presence of market power. When there is much wind smaller amounts of conventional generation technologies are required, and prices are lower, while at times of little wind prices are higher. This effect reflects the value of different generation technologies to the system. But under conditions of market power, conventional generators with market power can further depress the prices if they have to buy back energy at times of large wind output and can increase prices if they have to sell additional power at times of little wind output. This greatly exaggerates the effect. Forward contracting does not reduce the effect. An important consequence is that allowing market power profit margins as a support mechanism for generation capacity investment is not a technologically neutral policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|