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ID:
096703
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.
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| 2 |
ID:
100033
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the lieutenant-governor of the Punjab between 1913 and 1919, has perhaps one of the worst reputations in the history of the Raj, being commonly associated with brutality, repression and 'imperial terrorism'. In particular, his role in the administration of martial law between April and June 1919 has been heavily criticised. He has been accused of conducting coercion, torture and racial humiliation. Drawing upon archival records, including the numerous testimonies gathered by the official Government of India inquiry (the Hunter Committee), this article will reassess O'Dwyer's role in martial law, arguing that he was far more professional and sympathetic than has hitherto been assumed.
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