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Modern View
AID TO THE CIVIL POWER
(2)
answer(s).
Srl
Item
1
ID:
096703
Amritsar Massacre and the minimum force debate
/ Lloyd, Nick
Lloyd, Nick
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2010.
Summary/Abstract
This article re-examines one of the most infamous incidents in British imperial history: the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, and analyses it within the context of the British Army's minimum force philosophy. The massacre has long been regarded as the most catastrophic failure of minimum force in the history of the British Army. This article reconsiders the arguments over the shooting at Amritsar and the role of Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer, and questions the accepted view that the massacre was such a failure of minimum force. It argues that the circumstances surrounding the massacre must be understood before judging the incident and given these factors it is possible to see it within a minimum force framework.
Key Words
Indian Army
;
Jallianwala Bagh
;
Minimum Force
;
Amritsar
;
Aid to the Civil Power
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2
ID:
116259
Minimum force debate: contemporary sensibilities meet imperial practice
/ Mockaitis, Thomas R
Mockaitis, Thomas R
Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication
2012.
Summary/Abstract
No aspect of British counter-insurgency has been more problematic and controversial than the doctrine of minimum force. This common law principle provided ambiguous guidance for soldiers and police quelling unrest within a global empire and has become the subject of intense scholarly debate in the post-imperial era. The argument divides academics into two broad camps. One group sees minimum force as a vital element of a largely successful, uniquely British approach to counter-insurgency. The other claims that the legal principle never really restrained British security forces and considers the British approach to counter-insurgency neither unique nor particularly successful. This debate appeared in an exchange of views between John Newsinger and the current author in a 1990 volume of Small Wars and Insurgencies and more recently in a similar but lengthier argument between Rod Thornton and Huw Bennett in the same journal between 2007 and 2010.1 Such disagreements are of course endemic to academic discourse. This one, however, seems to be about more than history.
Key Words
Palestine
;
Insurgency
;
Northern Ireland
;
Arab revolt
;
Malayan Emergency
;
Counter - Insurgency
;
Mau Mau
;
Aid to the Civil Power
;
Dhofar Campaign
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