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| 1 |
ID:
126838
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines the implications of alternative forms of cap-and-trade regulations on the California electricity market. Specific focus is given to the implementation of a downstream form of regulation known as the first-deliverer policy. Under this policy, importers (i.e., first-deliverers) of electricity into California are responsible for the emissions associated with the power plants from which the power originated, even if those plants are physically located outside of California. We find that, absent strict non-economic barriers to changing import patterns, such policies are extremely vulnerable to reshuffling of import resources. The net impact implies that the first-deliverer policies will be only marginally more effective than a conventional source-based regulation.
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| 2 |
ID:
121280
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A U.S. nation-wide transmission overlay is a high capacity, multi-regional transmission grid, potentially spanning all three interconnections, designed as a single integrated system to provide economic and environmental benefits to the nation. The objective of this paper is to identify benefits to building a national transmission overlay and to lay out essential elements to facilitate continued dialog on this topic. A preliminary study performed on a national scale using a long term investment planning software illustrated that a national transmission overlay, under a high renewable penetration scenario, could result in cost-reduction of between one quarter trillion and one-half trillion dollars over a 40-year period, while promising to increase infrastructure resilience and flexibility.
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| 3 |
ID:
096729
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In electricity, "downstream" CO2 regulation requires retail suppliers to buy energy from a mix of sources so that their weighted emissions satisfy a standard. It has been argued that such "load-based" regulation would solve emissions leakage, cost consumers less, and provide more incentive for energy efficiency than traditional source-based cap-and-trade programs. Because pure load-based trading complicates spot power markets, variants (GEAC and CO2RC) that separate emissions attributes from energy have been proposed. When all generators and consumers come under such a system, these load-based programs are equivalent to source-based trading in which emissions allowances are allocated by various rules, and have no necessary cost advantage. The GEAC and CO2RC systems are equivalent to giving allowances free to generators, and requiring consumers either to subsidize generation or buy back excess allowances, respectively. As avoided energy costs under source-based and pure load-based trading are equal, the latter provides no additional incentive for energy efficiency. The speculative benefits of load-based systems are unjustified in light of their additional administrative complexity and cost, the threat that they pose to the competitiveness and efficiency of electricity spot markets, and the complications that would arise when transition to a federal cap-and-trade system occurs.
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| 4 |
ID:
097529
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In electricity, "downstream" CO2 regulation requires retail suppliers to buy energy from a mix of sources so that their weighted emissions satisfy a standard. It has been argued that such "load-based" regulation would solve emissions leakage, cost consumers less, and provide more incentive for energy efficiency than traditional source-based cap-and-trade programs. Because pure load-based trading complicates spot power markets, variants (GEAC and CO2RC) that separate emissions attributes from energy have been proposed. When all generators and consumers come under such a system, these load-based programs are equivalent to source-based trading in which emissions allowances are allocated by various rules, and have no necessary cost advantage. The GEAC and CO2RC systems are equivalent to giving allowances free to generators, and requiring consumers either to subsidize generation or buy back excess allowances, respectively. As avoided energy costs under source-based and pure load-based trading are equal, the latter provides no additional incentive for energy efficiency. The speculative benefits of load-based systems are unjustified in light of their additional administrative complexity and cost, the threat that they pose to the competitiveness and efficiency of electricity spot markets, and the complications that would arise when transition to a federal cap-and-trade system occurs.
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