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| 1 |
ID:
111323
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There is an ongoing discussion if it is reasonable to start using nuclear energy, to extend its use, or what effects its phase out could have. In July 2011, four months after the nuclear accidents in Japan, Germany decided to return to the policy of phasing out nuclear energy step by step until 2022. This policy was already decided upon in 2000. With this, a decision made some nine months earlier was taken back. In fall 2010, the government and Parliament had approved the extension of the operating lives of its nuclear plants by at least 14 years. One reason was the expected effect on the electricity price, which was said to be lower with extended nuclear plant life spans.
However, there is an ongoing debate on this argument, not only in Germany. This article presents a critical survey of the core arguments brought forward in favour of expected future price cuts. It is shown that the theoretical electricity market models used in these exercises are not adequate to reliably predict such effects. Furthermore, evidence is presented suggesting that extending nuclear plant life spans or the commissioning of new reactors in other countries is unlikely to curb domestic electricity prices.
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| 2 |
ID:
166481
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Electricity market models are widely employed to study the role, impacts and economic viability of new technologies. Sources of arbitrage, such as storage and transmission, are increasingly seen as essential for integrating higher shares of variable renewables. Understanding their operation and business case requires models which accurately represent time-series of wholesale electricity prices.
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| 3 |
ID:
096729
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In electricity, "downstream" CO2 regulation requires retail suppliers to buy energy from a mix of sources so that their weighted emissions satisfy a standard. It has been argued that such "load-based" regulation would solve emissions leakage, cost consumers less, and provide more incentive for energy efficiency than traditional source-based cap-and-trade programs. Because pure load-based trading complicates spot power markets, variants (GEAC and CO2RC) that separate emissions attributes from energy have been proposed. When all generators and consumers come under such a system, these load-based programs are equivalent to source-based trading in which emissions allowances are allocated by various rules, and have no necessary cost advantage. The GEAC and CO2RC systems are equivalent to giving allowances free to generators, and requiring consumers either to subsidize generation or buy back excess allowances, respectively. As avoided energy costs under source-based and pure load-based trading are equal, the latter provides no additional incentive for energy efficiency. The speculative benefits of load-based systems are unjustified in light of their additional administrative complexity and cost, the threat that they pose to the competitiveness and efficiency of electricity spot markets, and the complications that would arise when transition to a federal cap-and-trade system occurs.
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| 4 |
ID:
097529
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In electricity, "downstream" CO2 regulation requires retail suppliers to buy energy from a mix of sources so that their weighted emissions satisfy a standard. It has been argued that such "load-based" regulation would solve emissions leakage, cost consumers less, and provide more incentive for energy efficiency than traditional source-based cap-and-trade programs. Because pure load-based trading complicates spot power markets, variants (GEAC and CO2RC) that separate emissions attributes from energy have been proposed. When all generators and consumers come under such a system, these load-based programs are equivalent to source-based trading in which emissions allowances are allocated by various rules, and have no necessary cost advantage. The GEAC and CO2RC systems are equivalent to giving allowances free to generators, and requiring consumers either to subsidize generation or buy back excess allowances, respectively. As avoided energy costs under source-based and pure load-based trading are equal, the latter provides no additional incentive for energy efficiency. The speculative benefits of load-based systems are unjustified in light of their additional administrative complexity and cost, the threat that they pose to the competitiveness and efficiency of electricity spot markets, and the complications that would arise when transition to a federal cap-and-trade system occurs.
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