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ID:
096735
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In many EU countries, the infrastructures for supplying electricity and gas (electricity networks, gas pipelines, and storage facilities) are still properties of the so-called vertically integrated undertakings (VIU) responsible for the extraction or generation, supply, and transmission and distribution of the energy. While competition can be promoted in the generation/production and supply side of the vertical integration, transmission and distribution segments remain natural monopolies that hinder market mechanisms. Vertical integration simply raises the possibility for incumbents to favor their own divisions and to block new entrants. As a result, non-discriminatory and equal access to the electricity and gas transmission and distribution networks, also LNG and storage facilities, is crucial to foster competition in politically delicate structures of the electricity and gas markets.
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| 2 |
ID:
097590
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In many EU countries, the infrastructures for supplying electricity and gas (electricity networks, gas pipelines, and storage facilities) are still properties of the so-called vertically integrated undertakings (VIU) responsible for the extraction or generation, supply, and transmission and distribution of the energy. While competition can be promoted in the generation/production and supply side of the vertical integration, transmission and distribution segments remain natural monopolies that hinder market mechanisms. Vertical integration simply raises the possibility for incumbents to favor their own divisions and to block new entrants. As a result, non-discriminatory and equal access to the electricity and gas transmission and distribution networks, also LNG and storage facilities, is crucial to foster competition in politically delicate structures of the electricity and gas markets.
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| 3 |
ID:
103627
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the possible effects of introducing TPA in district heating networks by identifying and scrutinizing a number of possible scenarios for increased competition. The analysis builds on a theoretical discussion of economic efficiency in district heating operations, and the possible impacts on consumer prices of a market opening. An important conclusion is that regulated TPA may have small positive effects on competition, and at the same time it can have a negative impact on the possibility to run the integrated district heating operations in a cost-effective manner. This conclusion stems in part from the observation that most district heating networks are local in scope. Moreover, district heating operations are highly interdependent in, for instance, that the level of the return temperature of the water will affect the efficiency of combined heat and power plants. For these reasons, the introduction of the so-called single-buyer model or, perhaps even more preferable, an extended and more transparent producer market could represent more efficient market designs. Moreover, in networks with clear natural monopoly characteristics an ex ante price regulation must be considered.
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| 4 |
ID:
166950
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| Summary/Abstract |
District heating (DH) can become a key infrastructure for achieving climate targets in the heating sector. In order to support the uptake of renewables in the DH sector, the European Commission proposed to open DH infrastructures to third parties. This will allow independent heat producers to supply heat produced from renewable energy sources and from waste heat to consumers connected to the grid.
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