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| 1 |
ID:
097597
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate summit, the USA announced an emissions reduction target of 17% by 2020 (relative to 2005), and the EU of 20-30% (relative to 1990). For the same time horizon, China offered to reduce the CO2-intensity of its economy by 40-45% (relative to 2005), but rejects a legally binding commitment. We use the targets announced by the EU and the USA to analyze the potential gain for China if it were to adopt a binding emissions target and join an international emissions trading scheme. We show that China would likely benefit from choosing a binding target well below its projected baseline emissions for 2020.
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| 2 |
ID:
096742
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate summit, the USA announced an emissions reduction target of 17% by 2020 (relative to 2005), and the EU of 20-30% (relative to 1990). For the same time horizon, China offered to reduce the CO2-intensity of its economy by 40-45% (relative to 2005), but rejects a legally binding commitment. We use the targets announced by the EU and the USA to analyze the potential gain for China if it were to adopt a binding emissions target and join an international emissions trading scheme. We show that China would likely benefit from choosing a binding target well below its projected baseline emissions for 2020.
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| 3 |
ID:
105762
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Along the lines of the Kaya identity, we perform a decomposition analysis of historical and projected emissions data for China. We compare the results with reduction requirements implied by globally cost-effective mitigation scenarios and official Chinese policy targets. For the years 1971-2000 we find that the impact of high economic growth on emissions was partially compensated by a steady fall in energy intensity. However, the end - and even reversal - of this downward trend, along with a rising carbon intensity of energy, resulted in rapid emission growth during 2000-2007. By applying an innovative enhanced Kaya-decomposition method, we also show how the persistent increase in the use of coal has caused carbon intensity to rise throughout the entire time-horizon of the analysis. These insights are then compared to model scenarios for future energy system developments generated by the ReMIND-R model. The analysis reaffirms China's indispensable role in global efforts to implement any of three exemplary stabilization targets (400, 450, or 500 ppm CO2-only), and underscore the increasing importance of carbon intensity for the more ambitious targets. Finally, we compare China's official targets for energy intensity and carbon intensity of GDP to projections for global cost-effective stabilization scenarios, finding them to be roughly compatible in the short-to-mid-term.
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| 4 |
ID:
098588
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the debate on post-Kyoto global climate policy, intensity targets, which set a maximum amount of emissions per GDP, figure as prominent alternative to Kyoto-style absolute emission targets, especially for developing countries. This paper re-examines the case for intensity targets by critically assessing several of its properties, namely (i) reduction of cost-uncertainty, (ii) reduction of 'hot air', (iii) compatibility with international emissions trading, (iv) incentive to decouple carbon emissions and economic output (decarbonization), and, (v) use as a substitute for banking/borrowing. Relying on simple analytical models, it is shown that the effect on cost-uncertainty is ambiguous and depends on parameter values, and that the same holds for the risk of 'hot air'; that the intensity target distorts international emissions trading; that despite potential asymmetries in the choice of abatement technology between absolute and intensity target, the incentive for a lasting transformation of the energy system is not necessarily stronger under the latter; and, finally, that only a well-working intensity target could substitute banking/borrowing to some extent-but also vice versa. Overall, the results suggest that due to the increased complexity and the potentially only modest benefits of an intensity target, absolute targets remain a robust choice for a cautious policy maker.
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