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| 1 |
ID:
096855
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article suggests that the asymmetry of capabilities underlying the transatlantic partnership is NATO's main source of stability. Drawing on insights from mainstream political Realism, we stress the virtues of asymmetry (i.e. providing the allies with a wide bargaining space, increasing the cost of defiance and reducing intra-allied competition). The presence of these characteristics gives member states the incentive to prolong the convergence of their otherwise different political interests. In light of this theoretical model, we formulate some policy prescriptions. In particular, we argue that the USA and European countries should continue developing their own particular areas of expertise - i.e. implementing a functional division of labour. Therefore, contrary to widespread opinion, we conclude that the transatlantic military gap shall not be conceived as a burden, but rather as a key asset for the preservation of NATO's effectiveness.
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| 2 |
ID:
121102
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Beginning in late 2011, successive US defence policy documents and official pronouncements explicitly depicted American strategy in Asia in Indo-Pacific terms. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton was the first top US official to frame expanding US partnerships with Australia, India, and Indonesia in the broader Indo-Pacific context. Subsequently, President Barak Obama reaffirmed Clinton's vision in his November 2011 speech to the Australian House of Representatives. Two months later, the Pentagon published its strategic guidance that directed the US military to 'rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region', declaring that American interests are 'inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia'. The 'pivot' to the Indo-Pacific has since become the driving force behind the US regional strategy.
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